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PREFACE and AKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Let me begin with a disclaimer: in my treatment of pornography, I have done my best to
avoid any representation of pornographic material in this thesis. This is not an easy task, given
the highly-contextual nature of pornography; something which might not have been pornography
in its original context could easily become pornography if represented out of context. Thus, in all
examples which I provide throughout the thesis, I have done my best to provide material which
was neither pornography in its original context, nor pornography in the context of this thesis.
Now, on to the preface.
My original list of thesis topics did not contain “pornography.” Instead, I had listed as
possibilities justice and human rights, the relationship between God and evil throughout
salvation history, or the implications of artificial intelligence for human nature. These topics,
important though they are, were obviously too unruly for a mere 60-page honors senior thesis. It
was partly for this reason that I began to strongly consider dropping out of the honors program in
the summer of 2015; I had just gotten married in January to my high-school sweetheart and first
love, Jessie, and we had shortly thereafter discovered we would be parents in late
September/early October of that year. With the responsibilities of fatherhood imminent, I didn’t
think I would have the time or mental resources to devote to solving problems which have
plagued humanity since the dawn of philosophy.
It was thus with some degree of relief when I had the inspiration to investigate
pornography, a more concrete and manageable topic. The inspiration came that summer, perhaps
due to some extent to the churnings of my new parental brain, with all its worries about my
future children’s exploits. I began to realize how rampant the problem of pornography was and
is, particularly in Western culture. And yet pornography is routinely downplayed as “no big
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deal” especially in popular media, with increasingly graphic sex scenes and rampant jokes about
pornography and masturbation as though they were simply natural things that all men (and some
women) participated in. I had a good sense of the falsity of this mindset, but it wasn’t until I
began my research that I came to realize just how varied and grave were the problems of
pornography.
I began the thesis process intending to follow the feminist debate on pornography
throughout the past 30-40 years. I had hoped to create a new, third position which would
overcome the current stalemate and reinvigorate public debate on the issue. I came to realize two
things, however, which changed my course: (1) that I could not fairly and fully represent both
feminist perspectives, being that I did not identify fully with either, and (2) that there were many
other perspectives outside of feminism which also had insight to offer on the topic of
pornography. I thus planned to broaden my scope, and analyze the phenomenon of pornography
through multiple ideologies and philosophies. Suddenly I faced the problem of a thesis project
too large to accomplish in the given timeframe, a familiar problem for me. And so, with the
extensive help of my thesis committee, I finally narrowed my topic to the one investigated in the
present thesis.
It is impossible to construct an appropriate response to pornography (or anything, for that
matter), until we understand it, and my research revealed the extent to which a good
understanding of pornography was precisely what was lacking in almost all previous and
ongoing debates. Thus, this thesis attempts to discover and define the essence of pornography; I
hope that this work will act as a foundation on which to begin construction of an appropriately
human response to the problem of pornography.
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I would like to thank first and foremost my thesis committee, Drs. Rebecca Vartabedian
and Jason Taylor, for their long hours of meetings, readings, advice, patience, and wisdom. This
thesis would not be what it is today without their influence, and I am supremely grateful to them
for all their tireless work and enthusiastic support. I would also like to thank Dr. Thomas Bowie;
I am hugely honored, in more ways than one, to have known him and worked with him during
my time in the honors program at Regis. I want to thank Drs. Mark Bruhn and Daryl Palmer,
who along with Dr. Bowie taught my freshman honors seminar The Idea of a University, one of
the most formative (though challenging and frightening) experiences of my life and especially of
my college career. I want to thank Drs. Thomas Howe and Cathy Kleier, for taking over the
honors program in Dr. Bowie’s stead and guiding us all through this terrifying and powerful
thesis process over the past year; thank you for keeping us on track, faithfully answering our
questions and reading our drafts, and constantly supporting us and urging us on to the finish line.
I have to thank my friends and family who have supported me and given me resources and ideas.
I finally have to thank my wife, Jessie; without her, I would not have attended Regis nor would I
have dreamed of applying to the honors program. Thank you, dear, for all your support, in the
form of food, of late-night philosophical discussions, of reading and listening to my many drafts
and half-formed thoughts. This thesis would not exist, nor would I be the same person, without
your invaluable presence.
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Chapter I
Introduction – The Problem of Porn Proposed

Often in today’s Western culture, pornography is considered to be “no big deal.” More
and more people are routinely consuming more and more pornography, more varied and more
extreme than ever before, all the while acclaiming pornography and defending it from censure.
These responses are based on perceptions of the essence of pornography as an art form, a
legitimate means to sexual exploration and self-expression. Unfortunately, attempts to truly
engage the question of pornography’s essence have been sadly lacking, both in popular culture
and academia; most commentators focus their energies on expressing their initial reactions to
pornography, while skimming over or ignoring completely the question of essence or definition.
Yet an understanding of what it means to be “pornography” is a necessary precursor to
constructing an appropriate human response to the reality of porn; as such, this thesis represents
a direct investigation into the essence of pornography. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that
pornography is not a subset of art but is in fact antithetical to art in terms of its actual effects in
society and individuals, and that the essence of pornography lies in a deep disrespect for and
misrepresentation of sexuality and human reality. As such, we ought not praise, consume, or
even ignore pornography, but instead must recognize and fight against the tangible dangers it
presents for society and humanity as a whole.
Contemporary American culture commonly views pornography as “no big deal,” both a
private habit and a normalized occasion for socialization. Thus we see in a survey conducted by
the Barna Group, 79% of men ages 18-30 watch videographic pornography at least once a
month, and 63% watch pornography several times a week. Pornography is not merely a quiet and
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private fetish consumed only by raunchy teenage boys and disgruntled middle-aged men,
however. A growing number of women consume pornography as well. According to the same
survey, 76% of women in the same age range watch pornography at least once a month, while
26% of women watch pornography several times a week. Nadine Strossen, in Defending
Pornography, notes, “Women, either singly or as part of a couple, constitute more than 40
percent of the adult videotape rental audience” (Strossen 144); more recent numbers of female
pornography consumers, especially when including other forms of pornography such as text
(think Fifty Shades of Grey), are undoutedly higher.
Along with increasing female audiences, pornography is becoming increasingly more
available to, and consequently more often consumed by, young people and children. In fact, of
the diverse audience to porn, kids ages 12 through 17 are the largest consumers of pornography
on the internet, with 42% of kids first viewing pornography before they turn 13 (Covenant Eyes
Inc. 10). The reasons for this are easy to see. With the ever-increasing availability of technology
and the internet, pornography via the internet becomes easier and easier to access. Many
websites offer free pornography of every kind and intensity, thus removing the financial
restrictions that might keep kids away from pornography. The anonymity of the internet also
allows children greater ease of access; gone are the days when it was necessary to purchase
pornographic magazines in-person. Now, the main deterrent for children on pornography sites is
a simple box to click which supposedly verifies that the user is at least 18 years old; clearly, this
box is no hindrance to children interested in pornography. Even if such a block were effective,
many pornography sites simply don’t implement such protection, and so the problem of
increased availability to young people remains, including increased early accidental exposure.
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With its growing audience, so too are the number of responses to pornography growing
more and more diverse. For some, pornography is a source of humor (Mulholland 99). Others
find pornography to be a legitimate means of sexual expression and pleasure. Writer Sallie
Tisdale claims, “Pornography tells me… that none of my thoughts are bad, that anything goes…
The message of pornography… is that our sexual selves are real” (Strossen 161). Some claim
that pornography is a critical source of sexual education (Strossen 166), while others think
pornography actresses find empowerment in getting paid to be “admired” (Berger et al. 80). At
the heart of these various responses is a belief that pornography is at worst merely a private,
personal, dirty fetish, while at best one of the only ways female sexual pleasure can be explored,
empowered, and facilitated.
The response of children to pornography is an interesting and important one, as well.
Monique Mulholland’s revealing study on the place of pornography in the lives of middle- and
high- school students, Young People and Pornography, discovered that humor is in fact the most
common response for children to pornography (Mulholland 99). Further, Mulholland observes
that, “When asked to discuss porn more specifically, young people were at strains to stress ‘it
was no big deal’” (Mulholland 103). With the increasing accessibility, affordability, and
anonymity of internet pornography comes the increase in pornography use and consumption by
young children, young children who themselves create unique ways of coping with and
responding to the reality of pornography in their lives.
With the rapid expansion of pornography, especially into the hands of the most
vulnerable in society – children – one question becomes immediately pressing: is porn really “no
big deal”? Is there a problem with porn? If so, what is it? If not, why is the subject of porn so
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often a controversial subject, inspiring intense offense and/or intense pleasure in those who come
across and discuss it? Mulholland notes:
As argued by McKee et al.: “Pornography not only stirs our bodies, it stirs our ethical and
political selves… Whatever you think of pornography, whether you consume it or abhor
it, or both, it is now a highly visible part of our world and one we all need to discuss and
deal with.” (Mulholland 3)
Feminism has to a great extent been the main source for discussions on pornography in the last
40 years, with ethical and political arguments both for and against it. Pornography for some is
one of the greatest sources of discrimination and degradation of women, using them to fulfill the
every whim and pleasure of the viewer; for others, pornography represents one of the greatest
sources of empowerment for women, a tool for educating the public about female sexual
pleasure. One thing is clear, however: pornography is in fact a “big deal,” no matter whether you
support it or fight against it.
Yet, while pornography may be a “big deal,” the more important question, whether or not
there is a problem with pornography, is yet to be answered. Some argue that pornography is an
art form which must be encouraged, giving expression to the sexual/physical/animalistic side of
humanity which is ordinarily ignored or even suppressed in society. But others, myself included,
find this equation of pornography and art to be deeply troubling. Properly understanding the
relationship between pornography and art is necessary to understanding how we ought to live
with respect to pornography in our lives, and will thus carry immense implications for both
pornographic and artistic expression in our culture.
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If we are to respond properly to pornography, we must understand what pornography is.
This is also true if we are to understand the relationship between pornography and art. What even
is porn, anyway? In contemporary discussions on pornography, however, the problem of
definition is all-too-often ignored or poorly treated. Most sources either simply skip over the
problem of defining their subject, while others take up a quick and consequently insufficient or
inaccurate definition for the sake of moving on to outlining their own responses to it. Michael
Rea, in recognizing this grievous oversight, directly tackles the issue of definition in his essay
“What is Pornography?” Indeed, Rea’s essay, in my estimation, constitutes the best, most
thorough, and most authoritative essay on pornography available in the literature today, precisely
because it offers such a clear, concise, and well-argued definition of pornography. I will use
Rea’s definition, then, as the foundation of the thesis that follows. I will present his definition in
full detail, critically engaging with it in my own logical-ethical philosophy, concretely applying
it in historical investigation, and ultimately modifying, revising, and (in my view) perfecting it in
the context of the relationship between pornography and art.
With this new definition of pornography, the task of crafting a response to pornography
will be much easier to consider. Ought pornography to be censored completely, as argued by
prominent radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin? This would
seem to endanger certain forms of artistic expression, however; without a clear definition of
pornography as it relates to art, censorship could mean that all sexual expression, whether
pornography or not, could be suppressed. Ought pornography to be limited and regulated? This
holds the same dangers as the previous question. Perhaps pornography ought to be celebrated
and encouraged in society, as is art? But surely no one would argue that we ought to have
museums dedicated to the display of pornography, nor that we ought to have government
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funding of pornographic expression and production. Perhaps pornography simply ought to be left
alone and enjoyed by all, as argued by prominent libertarian feminists such as Nadine Strossen?
But if pornography is truly a danger to society as some think it to be, then we surely must do
something about it, even if that something is simply learning more about it, as the present thesis
is hoping to achieve.
By the end of this thesis, I hope to show not only that pornography is in fact a very big
deal in today’s Western culture as well as any other cultural context, but that it is dramatically
different from art to the extent that any attempt to equate or reconcile the two would represent a
drastic attack on the integrity of art. While I would not argue for the censorship of pornography,
the nature of pornography must be clearly understood in order that the discussion on how to
respond to pornography can proceed as accurately and trustworthily as possible. Pornography is
not art, and should not be available to children. Pornography is not art, and does not in fact make
any positive claims about women (or men, for that matter), or their sexuality or liberty.
Pornography is a danger to society, and must be understood and dealt with as such. It is my hope
that the following investigation will set the stage for discussing precisely how we ought to deal
with the problem of porn.
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Chapter II
The Ethical Perspective on Pornography

If we are to respond appropriately to pornography, we must first understand the essence
of pornography; what does it mean for something to be “pornography?” The answer to this
question, as is often the case when the task of definition is at hand, is notoriously difficult to pin
down. This difficulty led Justice Potter Stewart, in a 1964 obscenity case, to lament, “I shall not
today attempt further to define [obscenity]… But I know it when I see it” (Potter as quoted in
Strossen 53). While this approach to definition may function well enough in personal or informal
matters, it is far too subjective and relative in the search for an objective, stable, and permanent
definition such as legal or philosophical ventures require.

Common Definitions of Pornography
One commonly accepted definition is that pornography must be both sexually explicit
and intended to be sexually arousing, coming from Webster’s International Dictionary (Strossen
18); it is this approximate definition which Nadine Strossen seems to accept in her book,
Defending Pornography. Monique Mulholland, however, in her book Young People and
Pornography, recognizes how quickly such a simple definition turns complex and convoluted:
“[T]his ‘common sense’ definition is very contentious. How do we define sexually explicit? And
arousal? And how does it differ from other kinds of sexualized expression, erotica, for
example?” (Mulholland 41). I might add that sexualized art must itself be distinguishable from
pornography, but this “common sense definition” can support no such distinction, for it is far too
broad. Mulholland continues on: “[P]ornography is a category for which there is no universally
14

agreed definition or meaning” (McNair as cited in Mulholland 41). Clearly, the essence of
pornography as an academic issue is just as contentious as the broader issue of how we ought to
respond to pornography, as explored earlier.
Luckily, despite the lack of academic consensus on the question, we are not totally alone
in the formidable task of definition. Michael Rea, in his thorough treatment of this question in his
essay “What is Pornography?,” acknowledges, “[I]t is easy to see why it is often lamented that
the definition of ‘pornography’ is as elusive and the referent is pervasive” (Rea 118). He thus
recognizes the importance of pornography as increasingly “pervasive” (pornography is a “big
deal”), but also recognizes the lack of an adequate preexisting definition which we can use to
clarify, classify, and respond to concrete instances of pornography. He goes on to construct what
is perhaps the best definition of pornography available today.
By way of prefacing his own definition, Michael Rea begins his discussion by identifying
the existence of six main classifications for previous attempts at defining “pornography” which
past commentators and thinkers have offered. Rea lists the following:
(i) those that define ‘pornography’ as the sale of sex for profit, (ii) those that define it as a
form of bad art, (iii) those that define it as portraying men or women as, as only, or only
as sexual beings or sexual objects, (iv) those that define it as a form of obscenity, (v)
those that define it as a form of (or contributor to) oppression, and (vi) those that define it
as material that is intended to produce or has the effect of producing sexual arousal. (Rea
123)
Rea not only introduces each of these classifications here, but systematically engages with each
class throughout the first half of his essay, exploring their major proponents, arguments, and
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weaknesses. Rea thus recognizes and responds directly to the major voices in the debate over the
definition of pornography, helping his readers understand both the definitions themselves as well
as how they can fall short. I will present and critique Rea’s specific analyses of these categories
later in the paper as they become relevant and important; understanding his treatment of the first,
second, fourth, and fifth categories will be particularly helpful. For now, it is sufficient to take
note of Rea’s categories, recognizing the extensive work he has done in leading up to his own
definition. Ultimately, Rea claims that each one of these definitions, while each plagued by their
own specific difficulties, are insufficient for one simple reason: “[T]here are or could be cases of
pornography that do not have any of the characteristics picked out by these six kinds” (Rea 123).
In other words, pornography exists either in reality or hypothetically which may fulfill any one,
or none, of the above definitions.
Part of the reason for this inherent inadequacy in each of the definitions presented,
according to Rea, is that each one attempts to define pornography as having a real, tangible,
ontological basis within the objects of pornography. As Rea claims, “The property of being
pornography isn’t an intrinsic property of anything, and it does not supervene on the intrinsic
properties of anything” (Rea 135). Rea here clarifies that “pornography” is simply a label used
for classification of objects within certain contexts, such that the label may be applied to or
removed from any object, depending on the context, without removing or adding anything
necessary to the object’s integrity or being. The classification “painting” relies on (or supervenes
upon) certain inherent qualities in the object it designates (e.g., the use of paints in the object’s
creation), such that the painting must continue to be a painting in any context; the classification
“pornography,” however, is different. Neither is “pornography” itself an inherent quality in any
object. The reason for these claims is that objects of pornography seem to rely more on their

16

immediate socio-cultural context rather than on any inherent ontological quality in order to merit
the label “pornography.” Rea takes as his paradigmatic example a nude picture of Marilyn
Monroe which appeared in Life magazine in 1996; he claims, “Most people will agree that had
the same picture appeared in the pages of Hustler, it would have been pornographic” (Rea 118).
According to Rea, then, context then is the necessary determinant of the essence of
“pornography.”

Michael Rea’s Definition
Based on this fundamental assumption of the necessity of context, Rea moves on to his
own definition of pornography, in two-part structure: the first part tackles what it means for
something to be treated as pornography, and the second tackles what it means for something to
be pornography. Rea’s definition is as follows:
Part 1: x is used (or treated) as pornography by a person S =DF (i) x is a token of some
sort of communicative material (picture, paragraph, phone call, performance,
etc.), (ii) S desires to be sexually aroused or gratified by the communicative
content of x, (iii) if S believes that the communicative content of x is intended to
foster intimacy between S and the subject(s) of x, that belief is not among S’s
reasons for attending to x’s content, and (iv) if S’s desire to be sexually aroused or
gratified by the communicative content of x were no longer among S’s reasons for
attending to that content, S would have at most a weak desire to attend to x’s
content.
Part 2: x is pornography =DF it is reasonable to believe that x will be used
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(or treated) as pornography by most of the audience for which it was produced.
(Rea 120)
In terms which are easier to digest, Rea’s definition claims that there are four main qualifications
that must be met for something to be used as pornography: 1) the pornography object must
communicate a message in some way, whether visually, linguistically, aurally, etc; 2) the user
must seek sexual arousal or gratification from the content of the pornography object’s
communicated message; 3) the user must not seek any intimacy from another via the
pornography object’s communicated message; and 4) the only purpose of the pornography
object’s communicated message must be sexual arousal or gratification, such that the object
either does not well achieve or does not even attempt to achieve any other purpose. The second
part of Rea’s definition takes the crucial step: that which will likely fulfill each of these four
qualifications with the majority of its intended audience is pornography.
Rea’s definition certainly seems appealing. He explicitly attempts to solve the contextual
issue by “eliminat[ing] the property being pornography from our strict ontology” (Rea 140). He
compellingly continues: “How could [something] be pornographic at one time but not at
another? The answer is simple: at one time but not at the other it was reasonable to believe that
most of the target audience would treat it as pornography” (Rea 141). The key here, then, is not
whether the producer of the pornographic material intended for the objects to be pornography, as
Strossen argued above. Rather, objects of pornography are classified as such if the intended users
of the objects actually use them as pornography – in other words, the burden of pornography
classification falls away from the producers and on to the consumers. However, despite the great
care with which Rea crafts his definition, it still leaves much to be desired. Let us look at his
definition step-by-step.
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The first part of the definition begins with the first qualification of something’s being
used as pornography – pornography consists in tokens of communicative materials, and here Rea
intends tokens to be understood in opposition to types of such materials. Rea understands the
word “types” in this instance to designate different communicative mediums or kinds, such as
photograph, video, text, audio recording, etc., while “tokens” designates contextually distinct
manifestations of each type; there may be multiple tokens of any given type. Consider for
example the Marilyn Monroe nude, which might itself be considered as a type of the
communicative material photograph. Some tokens, or representations, of that photographic type
appeared in one context, “in calendars in the late 1940’s, [while] others appeared in Life in 1996”
(Rea 135). By talking about tokens of communicative materials, Rea allows for different tokens
of the same type of object to be different in their designation as pornography, depending upon the
context in which they appear, whether that contextual difference be temporal, geographic,
cultural, generic (as the difference between the genre “pin-up calendars” and the genre “news
magazines”), etc. Thus, the Marilyn Monroe nude in this example is the type, while each specific
representation of that nude in its various contexts are different tokens of that type. Each token is
the same picture (the same type), but is a distinct token, which allows for the hypothetical
Hustler token to be classified as pornography while the Life token is not.
The second qualification claims that pornography is indeed sexual, insofar as the user
desires sexual stimulation from the pornography object. Further, it is important for Rea in this
qualification that sexual stimulation come from the communicative content of the material, and
not in some other way. In other words, a picture communicates meaning visually, and so a
picture will be pornography only if the user desires visual sexual stimulation. Sexual stimulation
originating in any other sense is not adequate – a picture which sexually stimulates a user in any
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way other than visually is not thereby pornography because the sexual stimulation is not tied in
any way with the picture as a picture. Whether a picture is pornography or not is irrelevant to
whether a user might desire sexual stimulation via communicative content not inherent to the
picture (Rea 136).
Rea’s third qualification is that pornography has nothing to do with intimacy, but rather
everything to do with sex. Rea claims as illustration the following hypothetical:
[S]omeone who sends a complete stranger a nude photo of himself or herself with the aim
of initiating a purely sexual relationship (and with the reasonable belief that this aim will
be recognized and will be among the reasons for viewing the photo) does not send a
pornographic photo, even if the photo is in fact viewed primarily as a source of arousal
by the target audience. (Rea 136)
This hypothetical requires a bit of disentangling. It is important to differentiate between the
producer and the consumer in this relationship – the person sending the nude photo, for Rea,
does not necessarily produce or send pornography, since the sender reasonably believes the
photo will be used to initiate an intimate sexual relationship between the sender and the receiver.
The person receiving the photo, in using the photo as a source of arousal, does not therefore
cause the photo to become “pornography,” as long as the receiver also recognizes and responds
to the photo’s purpose as initiating a relationship. In any event, the salient feature is whether or
not the photo is actually used with the aim of initiating a relationship; the photo does not become
pornography until it is used without reference to such intimacy.
Rea runs into an interpretational mess with this hypothetical, however. He soon gives
another hypothetical which seems to contradict the first’s emphasis on a purely sexual
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relationship conveyed via the image, though he does not acknowledge this contradiction. He
imagines, “Intuitively, a narcissistic mirror dance doesn’t count as pornography for the same
reason a stripper’s erotic dance for his or her spouse does not count as pornography: dancer and
audience love one another and the dance is taking place at least in part as an expression of that
love” (Rea 137, emphasis mine). Note Rea’s emphasis on love in this hypothetical, where the
emphasis was on sex in the previous. In this hypothetical, the objects do not merit the term
pornography, not because they are intended to foster intimacy, but because they are expressions
of love.
These two hypotheticals seem to be amiss, then. In the first hypothetical, the nude photo
was not pornography simply because both producer and consumer used the photo for the sake of
a purely physical sexual relationship. In the second hypothetical, both producer and consumer
used the dance not merely for sex, but as an expression of love. In the first hypothetical, the
receiver would likely no longer consume, nor the producer any more produce, if the photo failed
to initiate physical, sexual arousal and pleasure. Yet in the second hypothetical, it is likely that
both producer and receiver would continue to engage in the transmission of the dance even if
sexual arousal and pleasure were no longer achieved, since the dance conveys something deeper
than mere sex. Does Rea consider purely physical sex to be constitutive of love, or has he made
some mistake in these two hypotheticals? Purely physical sexual relationships are arguably only
desired for sexual stimulation, whereas committed, loving sexual relations have some deeper
purpose, expressing not just sexual stimulation but love.
Finally, the fourth qualification is tied deeply with the second; because sexual stimulation
via the communicative content of pornography is the main motivation for using pornography, if
that sexual stimulation was no longer achieved, the user would likely not use that specific
21

instance of pornography any more. Note that this is in large part why the third qualification is
somewhat remiss – if sexual stimulation is the main motivation for the expression and/or
consumption of pornography, then the hypothetical stranger sending a nude photo in hopes of
achieving a purely physical sexual relationship is in fact sending pornography in order to achieve
that sexual stimulation; so too is the consumer receiving the photo in order to achieve arousal
and then further arousal and stimulation via a purely physical sexual relationship. The loving
couple (or, in Rea’s hypothetical, the narcissistic mirror dancer) has a deeper motivation behind
their sexual expression, such that if sexual stimulation was not achieved then the sexual
expression would likely still occur.
For the sake of clarity, then, Qualification three constitutes the area in which the first half
of Rea’s definition necessitates further consideration and modification. I would argue that the
problem here lies in that first hypothetical: a sexual image sent with the sole intention of
fostering a purely sexually intimate relationship would in fact qualify as pornography. Thus, the
third qualification should be revised with this in mind: if S believes that the communicative
content of x is intended to foster any intimacy besides purely physical or sexual intimacy
between S and the subject(s) of x, that belief is not among S’s reasons for attending to x’s
content. In other words, the user must not seek any intimacy other than physical/sexual intimacy
from another via the pornography object’s communicated message.
These four qualifications as to what it means to be used as pornography are thus in large
measure reasonable and acceptable, and they become totally acceptable with the addition of my
modification to the third qualification. The second part of Rea’s definition, however, is less
certain. Remember that the second part of Rea’s definition claimed simply that pornography is
that which is it reasonable to assume will be used as pornography by the majority of its targeted
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audience. Consider first Rea’s emphasis on pornography’s target audience, as opposed to its
actual audience. This qualification can seem understandable at first; by placing the emphasis on
the target or intended audience, the burden of pornography classification falls to pornography
production rather than consumption, again an important distinction to make. In this way, wouldbe censors could scan materials as they are produced, looking for evidence that the producers
intended to create pornography, and remove pornography from the market before it ever reaches
the hands of potential consumers and users.
The implications of this emphasis simply aren’t feasible when considering Rea’s ultimate
goal, however, which isn’t to censor pornography but rather to simply explain how something
can be pornography in one context and not pornography in another context. Consider another of
Rea’s hypotheticals, “The Shoe-Fetishists” (Rea 122). In this scenario, an isolated island of
people is discovered, the inhabitants of which find magazines containing pictures of shoes to be
as sexually stimulating as more traditionally pornographic magazines (like Playboy or
Penthouse) are here in American Western culture. “Clearly,” Rea observes, “the shoe magazines
of this society are pornographic” (Rea 122). That is, shoe magazines which are produced on the
island for the island inhabitants are clearly pornography. But what distinguishes the shoe
magazines produced on the island for the islanders from those shoe magazines which are
produced here in America for Americans? Would not the shoe magazine, while certainly not
pornography in the context of American culture, still be pornography in the context of the ShoeFetishist Island? Not according to Rea, who goes on to argue, “The fact that most of something’s
actual audience treats it as pornography… is not sufficient to make it pornography since just
about anything, no matter how innocently produced, can (by various accidents) be treated as
pornography by most of its actual audience” (Rea 140). But this completely ignores the
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contextual issue by claiming that something can be pornography regardless of how it is actually
received and interpreted, or regardless of its context. That there must be something inherent
within the object of pornography which classifies it as pornography is a consequence Rea is
explicitly trying to avoid: as noted earlier, he recommends “that we eliminate the property being
pornography from our strict ontology” (Rea 140). As I understand it, Rea is simply misapplying
the token-type distinction as discussed above in the first qualification of part one of Rea’s
definition. Remember the discussion of the Marilyn Monroe nude earlier – two tokens of the
same type of picture could have different classifications regarding their status as “pornography”
depending upon the context of the respective tokens. One token, appearing in the context of an
early-mid 1900s pin-up calendar, might be rightly classified as pornography, while another
token, appearing in a 2000s news magazine, might be rightly classified as not pornography. In
the same way, the very same magazine, objectively, can subjectively become two different tokens
of the same type of magazine when it is present in two different geographic/cultural contexts,
even if the generic and temporal contexts are the same. In this way, one token of the magazine as
it exists in the context of Shoe-Fetishist Island can actually be pornography, while another token
of the magazine as it exists in the context of America can actually not be pornography.
There is yet another problem with Rea’s claim, located in his argument that “just about
anything… can… be treated as pornography by most of its actual audience” (Rea 140). It is hard
to justify this claim in its own right; while there are many varying sexual orientations and
preferences, these orientations are not wide-spread enough to suggest that anything can be
construed and treated as pornography by most of its audience. This is simply too grand a claim to
be substantiated in any way. As of right now, as far as I know there is in reality no such thing as
Shoe-Fetishist Island (there is no such thing as a group of people, sexually attracted to shoes,
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large enough to constitute the majority of any shoe magazine’s actual audience), and so things
like shoe magazines simply aren’t pornography, here or in any other real temporo-cultural
context. Ultimately, the necessity of considering context in pornography classification requires
that the burden of this classification fall to pornography consumption and not production, which
is opposite to the construction Rea implies, as discussed earlier.
Because of this necessary emphasis on consumption rather than production, how
something is actually received and used by the majority of its audience in one cultural context
can be a good indication of its status as pornography or non-pornography, and Rea’s definition
must be modified as such: x is pornography =DF it is reasonable to believe that x will be used (or
treated) as pornography by most of its actual audience. In other words, our own cultural context
places some restraints on what may or may not be considered pornography. While specific
pornographic interests and preferences will inevitably vary from individual to individual, general
pornographic interests will be generally uniform within one specific cultural context. Thus, the
classification of pornography need not be as relativistic as Rea asserts; on the contrary, a good
anthropological knowledge of any society or culture ought to be enough to discern a thing’s
status as pornography or not pornography. The question then becomes what can feasibly qualify
as a “good enough” amount of knowledge to make such a judgment call, but I think this question
is better left discerned and answered by the members of any given society when they begin the
work of investigating pornography in their own culture.

Rea Revised
In sum, Rea’s definition states that there are four qualifications that must be fulfilled in
order to use an object as pornography: the object must communicate meaning, the communicated
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meaning must be sexually stimulating, the object must not foster intimacy between producer and
consumer, and sexual stimulation must be the prime or sole reason for consuming the object. If
the use of an object by the majority of its intended audience fulfills these four qualifications, then
the object can be rightly classified as pornography. Despite the acuity of this definition, applying
more philosophical pressure reveals some weaknesses: it is not enough to say that the object in
question must not foster any intimacy between producer and consumer. Should the object in fact
foster purely physical sexual intimacy, this fact would not therefore disqualify the object from
the label “pornography.” Also, the emphasis on tracking the patterns of use of an object’s
intended audience over and against those of its actual audience unduly places the burden of
pornography classification on the side of production rather than on the side of consumption, a
consequence which ignores the very problem Rea tries to solve: the contextual problem. I thus
propose an amended version of Rea’s definition:
Part 1: x is used (or treated) as pornography by a person S =DF (i) x is a token of some
sort of communicative material (picture, paragraph, phone call, performance,
etc.), (ii) S desires to be sexually aroused or gratified by the communicative
content of x, (iii) if S believes that the communicative content of x is intended to
foster any intimacy besides purely physical or sexual intimacy between S and
the subject(s) of x, that belief is not among S’s reasons for attending to x’s
content, and (iv) if S’s desire to be sexually aroused or gratified by the
communicative content of x were no longer among S’s reasons for attending to
that content, S would have at most a weak desire to attend to x’s content.
Part 2: x is pornography =DF it is reasonable to believe that x will be used (or treated) as
pornography by most of its actual audience. (Rea 120, emendations are in bold)
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This new definition doesn’t change much of Rea’s original definition; I have only altered two
points, and have only sharpened or clarified the wording at that. And yet these changes
significantly improve the definition’s ability to accurately distinguish instances of pornography
from instances of non-pornography.
Rea’s definition is likely the best definition available in the literature on pornography
today, and I am indebted to his thoughtful work on the subject which has radically impacted my
own work; yet it is clear that his definition is not yet complete. Given the present understanding,
evaluation, and emendation of Rea’s work, let us turn now to some more concrete examples from
history. Applying my modified version of Rea’s definition to an historical investigation of
pornography will shed light on other possible gaps and imperfections in the definition, allowing
a more accurate understanding of the relationship between pornography and art. Let us discover
what pornography is and what it has done in the past, especially in the context of the origins of
the term “pornography” itself: eighteenth-century France, and the works of one Rétif de la
Bretonne.
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Chapter III
The Historical Perspective and the Origins of Pornography

A common argument in favor pornography is the claim that pornography is natural,
giving expression to some central part of our common human nature. As Nadine Strossen argues,
“The physical sensations involuntarily produced in the reader carry with them something that
touches upon the reader’s whole experience of his humanity” (Strossen 50). In this way, Strossen
believes pornography to be expressive of “humanity,” and moreover “whole” humanity. Yet if
this were true, one would expect to find pornography littered throughout human history, in much
the same way art is. By taking a historical perspective on pornography, I will show that the more
common judgment of historians is that pornography as a classification in its own right only arose
in late 1700s France. The relatively recent appearance of pornography in history calls Strossen’s
claim into question – the expected implications of her claim do not match reality. Further, a
closer investigation of the late 1700s as the period of the origin of the term “pornography” will
help reveal an essential piece in understanding pornography: its relation to obscenity as a form of
pushing against cultural boundaries, evidenced in part by its startlingly rapid expansion and
intensification in recent times. This rapid expansion itself illustrates one of the dangers posed by
pornography to society, as will be discussed in more depth later.

Ancient Pornography
It may seem easy to find examples of pornography from as far back in history as the
ancient world. Consider the sexually explicit descriptions of sex and rape in Greek mythology,

28

especially Zeus’ well-known exploits. Another possible example might be the famous Kama
Sutra, coming from ancient Hindu writings as a work on achieving sexual pleasure in life. Were
these works pornography in their time? Another impressive candidate for early pornography is
described in Monique Mulholland’s Young People and Pornography. She recounts the
uncovering of the ancient buried city of Pompeii near the Italian city of Naples, and the ways in
which the archaeologists dealt with what they found. She relates,
The explicit frescoes of Pompeii…troubled cataloguers of artifacts, worried about the
material getting into the wrong hands. These were consequently labeled ‘pornographic’
and locked away in the Secret Museum in Naples. At the same time these museum
cataloguers were carving out and grappling with this new term, the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED) was describing ‘pornographic’ for the first time. Indeed, the crossovers
are clearly evident, wherein the 1864 definition of ‘pornography’ was the ‘licentious
painting employed to decorate the walls of Pompeii.’ (Mulholland 54)
Note the connection that these Pompeiian pornographic works have with the earliest definitions
of “pornography” in the OED; this fact would make them an appealing candidate for an example
of early pornography, suggesting that pornography is indeed central to human nature.
Yet these and other examples from history up until the 1700s cannot be considered as
early examples of pornography for at least two reasons. The first is that, while some of these
instances may in fact be pornographic in the context of contemporary Western culture, historical
anthropology may reveal that they were not actually pornography in an immanently historical
way; in other words, the explicit frescoes of Pompeii may have been pornography from the
context of 1864 as evidenced by the OED, but perhaps they were not actually considered to be
anything like pornography in the context of their own time and culture. We must maintain the
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token-type distinction as discussed in the previous chapter in order to prevent ourselves falling
into classification which is not historically accurate. If we consider Pompeiian frescoes to be a
certain type of communicative material, then we can easily claim that one token of these frescoes
as they appeared in 1864 is in fact pornography, while another token of the frescoes as they
appeared in ancient Italy is in fact not pornography.
The second reason these early historical examples ought not be considered pornographic
has to do with understanding Rea’s fourth qualification of what it means to be used as
pornography: that sexual stimulation has to be an object’s primary or only purpose for that object
to be considered pornography. Monique Mulholland quotes Hunt’s The Invention of
Pornography saying, “If we take pornography to be the explicit depiction of sexual organs and
sexual practices with the aim of arousing sexual feelings, then pornography was almost always
an adjunct to something else until the middle or end of the eighteenth century” (Mulholland 51,
emphasis mine). As Mulholland continues, “Moreover, although there was no shortage of
obscene literature in Old Regime France, the category known as pornography, along with the
word itself, did not exist before the early nineteenth century” (Wyngaard 15). Usually, such
depictions were utilized in satiric materials, meant to criticize religious or political authorities.
With this in mind, the common position of historians is to place pornography’s origins in
the 1700-1800s. Amy Wyngaard, in her historical essay “Defining Obscenity, Inventing
Pornography,” observes, “[P]ornography derives its name from a work that is not pornographic:
Nicolas-Edme Rétif de la Bretonne’s 1769 treatise on prostitution, Le pornographe” (Wyngaard
15).1 As Rétif worked in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century France, we must ask: what

The etymology of the word “pornography” makes much sense with this in mind. As Mulholland elaborates,
“Coming from the Greek word graphos (writing, description) and pornei (prostitutes), the word literally describes
the writing and description of the life and work of prostitutes” (Mulholland 41). This deep connection with
1
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was the atmosphere at this time and place which created the concept of pornography, and thus
the necessity of coining the word? Wyngaard recognizes, “Most critical accounts of the history
of pornography note that the term is traceable to Rétif’s Pornographe, which they dismiss in the
same breath because of its non-pornographic status” (Wyngaard 19). Despite this apparently
non-pornographic work, Wyngaard nonetheless centers on Rétif’s other works, specifically Le
paysan perverti, as the foundation of the modern concept of pornography.

Rétif – The Father of Pornography
Rétif’s Le paysan perverti was not unlike more contemporary romance novels. It was
written in “sentimental” and “libertine” styles, and followed the exploits of a peasant Edmond,
who eventually “falls under the influence of the libertine Gaudet, who leads him into corruption”
(Wyngaard 20). Some of Edmond’s more shocking exploits include his act of incest with his

prostitution is especially interesting when considering Rea’s rejection of the definition of pornography “as the sale
of sex for profit” (Rea 123).
Recall Rea’s six classifications of pre-existing definitions of pornography as introduced in the previous
chapter; the first classification included definitions relating to profit. Rea’s first argument against this definition,
“that a lot of pornography is distributed for free… on the internet from private non-profit sites” (Rea 124), is not
convincing. Such supposedly “free” pornography sites most often include advertisements, and it is the fact of these
ads which disproves the existence of “free” porn (while television or radio programs may undoubtedly be consumed
for “free,” they are not produced without consideration for profit, as the presence of advertisements in these contexts
equally proves). Rea moves on to qualify this argument: “though a lot of pornography isn’t distributed for free,
clearly it could be” without jeopardizing its classification as pornography (Rea 124). The question is then whether
or not pornography would cease being pornography if monetary profit were no longer involved. At this argument, I
must admit that monetary profit for the producers of pornography is neither necessary nor sufficient for classifying
pornography as pornography, but then I would argue neither is such monetary profit necessary for classifying
prostitution as prostitution; the service of sex could be rendered for any number of other reasons, and would not
thereby be any less understood as prostitution.
Thus, despite Rea’s arguments as reviewed here, a connection between pornography and prostitution does
exist. Beyond this connection’s relation to Rea, I unfortunately do not have adequate space within this footnote to
fully perform this investigation myself, nor can I devote space to this investigation in the body of my paper. The
digression would represent too great a departure from my current argumentative objective and path. As such, the
relationship between pornography and prostitution represents one area which necessitates further research, as I will
discuss in my conclusion. For my purposes, it is currently sufficient to credit Rétif de la Bretonne with creating the
term as well as the genre which it designates.
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cousin, the attempted rape of his friend and “mother figure,” sex with a prostitute, the attempted
poisoning of his wife, and the murder of his sister Ursule. Ultimately, Edmond dies in a carriage
accident after marrying the woman he earlier nearly raped. Wyngaard further extrapolates on the
content of the book: “The novel features many sentimental commonplaces of the time: family
strife, rural virtue, urban vice. It also contains racy scenes and philosophical passages that Rétif
was determined to print as provocatively as possible” (Wyngaard 20). Clearly, Rétif’s Le paysan
perverti contains pornographic themes, and he more importantly desired to relate those themes as
pornographically as possible.
The importance of this work and its place in society at the time lies in the way it reveals
the interplay between intentional pornography and cultural standards of propriety. Wyngaard
writes
Rétif played an important role in circumscribing the moral and legal limits of sexual
representation in the eighteenth century and beyond. He did so not by producing blatantly
obscene texts but by pushing the boundaries of decency and propriety while inviting
censors and the public to hone their understanding of these concepts. (Wyngaard 19)
Rétif published three editions of Le paysan perverti, including an illustrated edition, between
1775 and 1787, “steadily extending the limits of the censors and the police to produce the most
provocative, and the most financially rewarding, works possible” (Wyngaard 18, emphasis
mine). Rétif’s work represented a conscious effort to test the limits of censorship in that time, as
is evidenced by the fact that his work was subjected to censorship several times throughout his
career. Wyngaard continues, “The multiple versions of Le paysan perverti… by documenting
changing censorial standards over the course of more than a decade, reveal the limits of the
publishable at various moments in late eighteenth-century France” (Wyngaard 45). To put this in
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terms more relatable to Rea, each version of Le paysan perverti might represent different tokens
of the book as it inhabited various temporal contexts; tokens of later editions of the work might
have been censored as pornography in earlier years, while tokens of the earlier editions would no
longer be considered pornography by censorial standards in later years.
Above, I have explained the ways in which pornography is determined according to its
cultural context, but the present discussion on Rétif implies a more complex relationship between
pornography and context. Wyngaard pushes the idea so far as to say that Rétif’s works “posed a
threat to morality and the social order that characterized pornography as it was first defined in
1806” (Wyngaard 47-8). In other words, while pornography was defined within a certain cultural
context – here eighteenth century France – it nonetheless threatened that very cultural context,
and the “social order” inherent within it. By constantly pushing the limits of censorship, Rétif
forced a re-evaluation of those same limits. Wyngaard importantly states that Rétif “appeared at
the cutting edge of a morality he helped dictate. Rétif worked both with and against the censors
to chip away at moral standards and turn material once considered indecent into something
acceptably racy” (Wyngaard 48, emphasis mine). The effect of Rétif’s inaugural pornography
was to widen the cultural ideas surrounding what was acceptable and what wasn’t.
Rétif’s work challenged (and to a certain extent changed) the moral climate of France. It
is important to note that, as the moral standards fluctuated and expanded to accommodate Rétif’s
pornography, Rétif expanded the pornographic nature of his work right along with it, and it is
this fact that forced the cultural moral standards to change so much. If he had written one edition
of his work, and left it to the whims of the censors, not much would have changed, if anything.
He would have been simply another writer who may or may not have gained the approval of the
censors. But because he continually edited and changed his work, he finally gained a certain
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amount of control over the censors. That his last edition was illustrated ought to be evidence
enough that censorship standards had widened to make room for his radical yet popular
publications.

Pornography as Obscenity
Thus, a central aspect of pornography, given to it by its inventor and coiner, seems to be
its relation to cultural ideas of acceptability. Pornography, in order for it to remain pornographic,
must put pressure on cultural norms, and the boundaries surrounding propriety. As pornography,
it does this in a sexual way; the more explicit the sexual material, the more it subverts the social
structure, and the more “pornographic” it becomes. In other words, pornography seems
necessarily to be “obscene,” a definition which Michael Rea explicitly argued against in the first
part of his essay. Going back to Rea’s six classifications of pornography definitions, the fourth
included those definitions which “define [pornography] as a form of obscenity” (Rea 123).
Why does Rea reject such definitions to the extent that obscenity makes no appearance
into his own definition? He acknowledges that obscenity by itself is not enough to declare
something to be pornography; he gives the example of raising one’s middle finger, a gesture
which is obscene in our American cultural context but certainly not pornographic (Rea 127).
Most existing obscenity definitions, then, include the qualification that pornography is sexually
explicit obscene material (Rea 128). It is this necessary added detail which Rea finds devastating
for obscenity definitions: “pornography need not be sexually explicit… As I have already
indicated, pornography cannot be just anything that is obscene. But if we are deprived of the
sexual explicitness qualification, what other one can we use? I can see none that will do the job”
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(Rea 128). The problem with Rea’s argument here is simply that he gives up too readily before
finding another qualification that might work, a qualification which he in fact does add to his
own definition of pornography. While pornography need not be sexually explicit, using
something as pornography does entail that sexual stimulation be the chief reason for using that
object. In other words, clearly sexual themes or ideas are an inherent part of pornography, and
pornography conveys these sexual themes in a way which is “obscene.” Thus, while pre-existing
obscenity definitions may be insufficient on their own terms, I feel an addition to Rea’s
definition is necessary – namely adding the idea that pornography must be obscene.
Rea has one more argument which might frustrate this suggested modification, however.
He argues, “there are two ways of taking obscenity definitions. We can take them as
normative… or we can take them as descriptive… Both are problematic” (Rea 128). Normative
definitions are those which claim something to be obscene if a person “should be offended by
[it], whether she is in fact offended by it or not”; descriptive definitions are those which claim
something to be obscene if a person “considered ‘average’ or ‘decent’” is “in fact” offended by it
(Rea 128, emphasis mine). According to Rea, if obscenity definitions are understood in the
normative sense, they are problematic insofar as they are “uninformative” (Rea 128). We can’t
know what should offend us if we have no definition for such materials other than the mere
claim that they should offend us. This argument certainly devastates the circularity of normative
definitions, but what of descriptive obscenity definitions? The problem with understanding
obscenity definitions in the descriptive sense, for Rea, is that supposedly “there is no reason to
expect that such a [definition] would reliably separate pornography from non-pornography” (Rea
129). Rea goes on, “[I]f people stopped being offended by magazines like Penthouse and
Hustler, those magazines would not necessarily cease to be pornographic” (Rea 129). At first,
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Rea’s statement here might seem false given our previous discussion on the importance of
context for pornography – if, in some future cultural context, people no longer took offense at
these magazines, then we ought to conclude that what we are discussing are new tokens of these
magazines in the new cultural context, and thus these new tokens may not be pornography in this
future context although they were pornography in earlier contexts. Yet I must admit that I
intuitively agree with Rea’s statement; somehow, these instances of pornography would retain
their pornographic status even if they were no longer considered “offensive” by the society at
large (though I suspect this intuition has mostly to do with the fact that I currently reside in a
cultural context in which they are in fact offensive).
I propose that the problem with Rea’s evaluation of descriptive obscenity definitions in
this sense is his reliance on the concept of “offense,” and in place of that term I suggest a new
one: “respect.” What is respectful of sexual morality will differ from context to context – in our
contemporary American context, breasts are highly sexualized, and the display of breasts is
usually considered inappropriate (and usually therefore offensive) because such a public display
is disrespectful towards sexuality. In the hypothetical Island of Shoe-Fetishists discussed in the
last chapter, shoe magazines might be considered pornography in part because the display of
shoes in such a manner was in fact disrespectful towards sex and sexuality as it is expressed and
understood in that cultural context. Thus, adding an obscenity qualification to Rea’s definition
wouldn’t revolve around offense, but rather cultural ideas of respect (though, again, offense is a
very likely reaction to disrespectful depictions such that disrespect and offense often go hand-inhand; thus Rea’s mistake here is certainly understandable). Insofar as Penthouse and Hustler are
inherently disrespectful of sexuality, they will remain pornographic. But should they in some
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cultural context no longer be actually disrespectful by the standards of the cultural majority, their
classification as pornography would be weakened if not altogether destroyed.

Rea Revised
Rea’s definition, when examined and applied from the historical perspective, remains
elegant and exceedingly helpful, but is missing a crucial piece. Pornography cannot be
pornography without some element of obscenity, of pushing against socio-cultural boundaries
around the appropriate and the acceptable in dealing with sexuality, of disrespect for cultural
standards of sexuality. Thus, the second part of Rea’s definition, which has to do with the quality
of being pornography, merits the following modification: pornography is that which it is
reasonable to believe will be used (or treated) as pornography by most of its actual audience, and
that which it is reasonable to believe is obscenely disrespectful towards sexuality by most
members of its socio-cultural context.
Why is it so important to include obscenity in an accurate definition of pornography?
Remember that pornography isn’t merely obscene in the sense that it is disrespectful of sexuality
in any given context, but it goes farther in that it challenges those notions of respect and the
boundaries by which those notions are defined. Mulholland wonders at pornography, saying, “I
still retain a sense of marvel at the ability of pornography to produce anxiety and challenge
borders” (Mulholland 3). Pornography necessarily pushes against and subverts cultural norms
surrounding what is acceptable and appropriate, and what is illicit and unacceptable. As a result,
those norms and boundaries are stretched out to accommodate the pressure. But pornography, in
order to remain pornography, simply grows more radical and extreme in order to continue
pushing against boundaries and to ensure its existence in the form of cultural subversion.
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Eventually, the boundaries will have been stretched so far as to allow the existence of the
extreme pornography we see today, which exhibits sexual violence, necrophilia, bestiality, and
even pedophilia.
This expansion of boundaries can be seen and analogized in the development of film and
television, and the way in which such programs have handled sex through the years. Television
couples, even those who were married, from popular shows such as I Love Lucy from the ‘50s
and Leave it to Beaver from the ‘60s, would sleep in separate twin beds so as to avoid any
suggestion of indecency. Today, however, standards are clearly different; sex scenes and partialto-full nudity of all sorts go unhindered, and are in fact encouraged by critics – the popular HBO
television series Game of Thrones, with its explicit depictions of sex, would never have existed
50 years ago. This is not to say that pornography is the cause of increased sexual indecency and
promiscuity in the mainstream media, but rather that clearly an expansion of boundaries around
propriety and impropriety as it relates to sexuality has taken place. At any rate, leaving televised
sexuality behind, pornography itself is clearly on the rise, and Mulholland notes this trend
specifically in young people (Mulholland 9).
Pornography, from its roots in the work of Rétif down to today, is detrimental to the
established social order. While it could be argued that this cultural subversion is a good thing,
providing needed refreshment to a stale social order with old and tired views on sexuality, it also
must be asked where the effects of porn will stop. Now we see extreme pornography growing
ever more extreme; Susan Hawthorne, in her essay “Ancient Hatred and Its Contemporary
Manifestation: The Torture of Lesbians,” writes of this extreme pornography, which has begun
to include violent depictions of rape, sadomasochism, and torture. She claims, “Pornography is a
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way of making money out of torture” (Hawthorne 43). She states the problem of porn’s radical
nature thusly:
[If] acts identical to torture – humiliation, violent penetration with objects, cutting off of
clothes, bondage – are acceptable in a BDSM scene, and are deemed philosophically
acceptable, where does the slide down the slippery slope begin and end?... The effect of
the acceptance of torturing acts is a de-moralizing of the culture. (Hawthorne 44)
If pornography continues to grow more extreme, eventually social boundaries won’t be able to
exist in any sensible meaning in relation to sexuality and sex. The “boundary bubble” must
eventually reach a breaking point and “pop,” leaving the ruined chaos of an amoral society in its
wake. At that point, pornography under the qualification of obscenity will cease to exist, because
there will be no more cultural boundaries to situate itself in relation to. Are these worries too
extreme? Perhaps for our current cultural context, but the point ought to be clear anyway,
illustrating the very real and very possible meltdown of social values in the future if pornography
remains unchecked. Boundaries serve a true function and purpose in society and should not be
overturned for the mere sake of overturning boundaries, undiscerningly and haphazardly in the
way that pornography does.
With our growing understanding of the essence of pornography, we are now at a better
position from which to examine its relationship to art and aesthetics. With Rea’s ethical
definition slightly expanded and modified from further philosophical and historical argument and
thought, I now turn to aesthetic and artistic perspectives. Can art be porn? Can porn be art? We
must begin by examining borderline cases which profess to blur the distinction between art and
pornography.
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Chapter IV
The Aesthetic Perspective and the Similarities Between Art and Pornography

Art has consistently held a place of honor throughout human history, in all its various
mediums and forms. Art’s sublime beauty captures its consumers in throes of transcendent
rapture. On the other hand, Art’s brutal honesty can subvert cultural perspectives and constructs,
creating an atmosphere of uncomfortable tension as its consumers struggle to come to terms with
their newfound open-mindedness. Art can serve as a powerful means of self-expression, working
with humanity’s innate creativity to discover, define, and express identity on both an individual
and cultural level.
While my readers will likely accept the foregoing considerations of art as widelyunderstood if not self-evident, I wonder how readily acceptable they will find the argument that
pornography, too, potentially fills these functions. Pornography, too, supplies deep pleasure to its
consumers, uncomfortably and sometimes repulsively subverts cultural standards, and works as
one of the only avenues for sexual exploration, encouragement, and expression. Many propornography thinkers put forth just this argument. Nadine Strossen claims, “Sexual expression is
an integral aspect of human freedom” (Strossen 218); insofar as pornography gives air to this
“freedom,” Strossen further argues: therefore “[p]ornography also has literary value” (Strossen
144). Strossen’s pornography has such “value” not only in spite of but because of pornography’s
ability to offend: “[I]ts subversive quality challenges the entire status quo, including social
structures that inhibit women’s freedom” (Strossen 176). Note that this argument is precisely the
argument considered at the end of the previous chapter – that the obscenity of pornography in
upsetting cultural boundaries may actually be beneficial by overturning old, stale customs in
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favor of newer, fresher, more holistic cultural views. Adair Rounthwaite takes the argument for
art-porn even further, arguing for videographic pornography as “a form of performance
documentation that is designed to create a new performance – of a sexual sensation, and often of
masturbation, accompanied by orgasm – in the viewer” (Rounthwaite 63). In this way,
pornography by Rounthwaite’s estimation is not only an art form of sexual self-expression; it is
actually a uniquely higher art form in the way it transcends mere self-expression by directly
encouraging similar sexual self-exploration and -expression in its viewers.
To consider pornography as an art form may be possible, but I can hardly consider such a
correlation to be desirable. Could it possibly be right to claim that pornography ought to be as
highly-esteemed as art – ought there to be museums of pornography and public funding of
pornography? Insofar as art probes the deepest truths of what it means to be human, is the story
of humanity as told by pornography acceptable, desirable, true? There is, for me, a deep-seated
repulsion to this equation of art and pornography; while this affective response is not in itself
adequate to deny an equation between pornography and art, this repulsion nonetheless requires
thorough and honest investigation. For example – if pornography in Strossen’s estimation
“challenges the entire status quo, including social structures that inhibit women’s freedom,”
wouldn’t it also challenge social structures which promote women’s freedom? While this may be
true of pornography, surely it cannot be true of art!(?)
This repulsion may merely be the result of social anti-pornography programming, or
perhaps it is indicative of some deeper truth concerning the mutually-exclusive natures of art and
pornography. Resolving the implications of this repulsion will constitute my objective for the
remainder of this thesis. In this chapter, I will examine certain borderline cases of what I shall
term “artistic pornography” and “pornographic art.,” cases which complicate the distinction
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between art and pornography. In so doing, I will review the arguments which call for equating
pornography and art. The next chapter will then make the final argument to distinguish art and
porn as unequitable and in fact mutually exclusive classifications – what is art cannot also be
pornography, and what is pornography cannot also be art. But let us take each step in turn.

Is Porn Art?
To begin exploring the border between art and pornography, and the cases which
dismantle this border, let us begin again with Michael Rea. What is his estimation of the relation
between art and pornography? The second in Rea’s list of six pre-existing pornography
definitions is here immanently relevant: “[those which] define [pornography] as a form of bad
art” (Rea 123). The reason these definitions fail is that the qualification “bad art” is neither
sufficient nor necessary to create pornography. On the side of sufficiency, Rea claims that
botched or anatomically incorrect naked pictures which appear in textbooks will have little-to-no
artistic value, but neither will such pictures have pornographic value (Rea 125). As a second
example, Rea claims that a man with little artistic ability who poorly paints a picture of himself
having sex with his wife will of course produce “bad art,” but will not necessarily produce
“pornography.” I feel these examples are a bit messy in their focus on sexual themes in order to
advance Rea’s argument – a sufficient and clearer example would have been the perusal of any
101 art class final: it is clear many examples of bad art will be present, but it is equally clear that
none would therefore be pornography.
The more important argument for my present purposes comes from his argument on the
side of necessity. Rea asserts, “[A] lot of what actually counts as pornography is not at all
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obviously art, much less bad art” (Rea 125). Rea’s makes an interesting move here: he both
separates and joins the categories of art and pornography. Some pornography is “not at all
obviously art,” and therefore pornography is not necessarily a sub-set of art, but is in fact
distinguishable from it. However, some pornography is “not… bad art,” but could in Rea’s view
be counted as good art, and therefore pornography and art are not mutually-exclusive categories
either. He goes on to say, “[T]he most ubiquitous examples of pornography – pictures of the sort
found in Playboy and Penthouse – seem clearly to count as art… As Jon Huer notes… many of
the photographs in such magazines are technically quite good; and some of the poses are not
unreasonably construed as artistically inspired” (Rea 125). Insofar as art entails highly-skilled
and often “inspired” construction towards some telos, much pornography is undoubtedly
skillfully crafted towards its end of arousal and could thus qualify as art.

Artistic Pornography
With Rea’s position in mind, some concrete examples will be helpful. Some feminist
commentators and thinkers don’t stop at mere technical prowess, but claim that some
pornography can be art in a deeper and more meaningful way. In arguing for pornography as an
art form, feminists will often cite the work of Karen Finley, whose “art… involves exhibition of
her own body, smearing food on herself, and inserting objects into herself” (Strossen 104).
Strossen interprets Finley’s work as “angry protests against sexual abuse, violence, and
discrimination against women” (Strossen 104). The most prominently cited example of artistic
pornography, however, is that produced by Annie Sprinkle, a porn-star turned artist, feminist,
and sexual-educator. Monique Mullholland observes,
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As a self-proclaimed post-porn modern artist, Annie Sprinkle’s art includes allowing the
audience to come onstage and view her cervix, bringing herself to orgasm as part of the
performance art, and selling pubic hair and soiled underwear… As argued by Straayer
(1993) and Williams (2004), her work is deconstructive, challenges distinctions between
art and porn, and significantly disrupts hegemonic ideas of sexual difference.
(Mullholland 46)
Sprinkle’s work in particular seems clearly to be pornography, so much so that Deep Inside
Annie Sprinkle, the first film she both starred in and directed, “became the second-largestgrossing porn film of 1981” (Rounthwaite 67). But is it art? In Rounthwaite’s estimation, the
most important scene in Deep Inside is a masturbation scene, which she analyzes as emphasizing
“women’s self-pleasure” (Rounthwaite 67), and the reality of a female orgasm, a “realness…
positioned as a challenge to masculinist porn production practices that negate women’s pleasure”
(Rounthwaite 68). In other words, while Sprinkle’s and Finley’s works can be classified as
pornography, they can also be classified as art insofar as they (perhaps uncomfortably or
offensively) perform the function of commenting on and challenging social norms.

Pornographic Art
There are also many examples which blur the distinction between art and pornography
from the other side of the divide, i.e., works which are commonly understood to be works of art,
but seem also to be pornography. For example, consider Sandro Botticelli’s Birth of Venus (Fig.
1). This famous piece of art comes from the Italian Renaissance, and features prominently the
figure of Venus in the foreground, nude. It may be granted that Venus, while nude, is covering
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herself with her hair and hands, yet still her bare left breast is visible. Interestingly, the male
figure of Zephyrus is partially clothed to hide his nudity, while the female nymph Chloris whom
he carries reveals her left breast as Venus does. While this piece of art clearly displays great
technical skill and is an example of a production from one of the greatest periods of art history, it
nonetheless could be construed as pornography in its depictions of the naked female body,
especially considering the idealized figure of Venus, who is unrealistically without blemish or
imperfection, just as the figures portrayed in modern pornography.

Fig. 1 – Botticelli, Sandro. Birth of Venus. c. 1484-86. Uffizi Gallery. ItalianRenaissance.org. Web. 11 Nov 2015.
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Pornographic art also extends to literature. In his essay “Teaching ‘Dirty’ Books in
College,” Robert Boyle explains, “Certain works of Graham Greene and James Joyce, for
example, have by some teachers and critics been judged to be pornographic and unfit for the eyes
and minds of students” (Boyle). While Boyle is not of this mind himself, he attempts to relate the
reasoning of such censor-minded teachers with regard to Joyce’s Ulysses, saying that “much of
his vision is disgusting” in its dealing “directly with sin and particularly with sexual sin” (Boyle).
Boyle claims that such “disgust” “can be expected when the sinful human heart is being
revealed” (Boyle). Ulysses is undoubtedly one of the most influential and profound of Joyce’s
works, and arguably also one of the most influential of the 20th century in general. Ulysses must
be art, but as Boyle’s censor-minded teachers illustrate, it could also be received as pornography.
I must give one more example to press the point.

On Chesil Beach
I will take as my paradigmatic example of pornographic literature not Joyce’s Ulysses,
but rather Ian McEwan’s On Chesil Beach. What follows is a linguistic analysis of the work in
an attempt to firmly establish it as a brilliant work of art. The analysis of this work will not only
reveal much about pornographic literature as a classification itself, but will also contribute
significantly to our understanding and exploration of the repulsion to the concept of “porn-art”
that I discovered at the beginning of this chapter.
The very beginning of On Chesil Beach sets the scene for the graphic depictions of sex
and sexuality to come later in the novel. It begins with the words, “They were young, educated,
and both virgins on this, their wedding night, and they lived in a time when a conversation about

46

sexual difficulties was plainly impossible. But it is never easy” (McEwan 3). Throughout the
book, we learn of the couple Florence and Edward, their relationship, and their own unique
struggles with their sexuality and the act of sex shared on their wedding night. Ultimately, the
couple fails to consummate their marriage, and each eventually goes his/her own separate way;
Florence lives a better life making beautiful music in a string quartet with her friends, while
Edward seems to age rather ungracefully, alone and merely listening to jazz or rock and roll
records.
To understand how On Chesil Beach can function as art, consider McEwan’s extreme
dexterity with words as given in the opening paragraph of the book. Having just sat down to
dinner in their honeymoon suite, “Edward did not mention that he had never stayed in a hotel
before, whereas Florence, after many trips as a child with her father, was an old hand” (McEwan
3). Consider what McEwan is suggesting here, that somehow Edward is less experienced than is
Florence when it comes to “hotel rooms,” a hotel room which they have for the purposes of
sexual consummation that night. Yet are they not both virgins, as the first lines of the book
(quoted earlier) claim? Why share this detail of hotel rooms – what is McEwan hinting at?
Through the story, we gradually accumulate details which suggest – but importantly
never explicitly reveal – what this crucial difference is between the two lovers. Let us spend
some time with McEwan’s words on Edward’s and Florence’s separate misgivings about their
wedding night, misgivings “which they could not describe to each other” (McEwan 7). Edward’s
concern was very focused:
His specific worry, based on one unfortunate experience, was of overexcitement, of what
he had heard someone describe as “arriving too soon.” The matter was rarely out of his
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thoughts, but though his fear of failure was great, his eagerness – for rapture, for
resolution – was far greater. (McEwan 8)
While Edward’s worry is indeed specific, he does not possess of himself the words to understand
his situation; he instead relies on someone else to name his fear: that of “arriving too soon.” He
hasn’t fully understood his condition, not to the extent that he is comfortable voicing it to
Florence, at least. And yet his fear is overshadowed by his excitement. He is excited for
“rapture” and “resolution,” not for love or sharing, and thus his desires seem firmly planted in
himself; he needs rapturous pleasure (arguably of the sort offered by pornography), and also
“resolution” of some problem which he believes will be answered by sex. Perhaps his thought
process of using sex for personal pleasure and the resolution of some personal problems are akin
to how pornography is often used in society, viz., as a source of personal pleasure and the
resolution to the paradox of animalistic sexuality in rational human civilization. Also take note of
the source of his worry, which is “based on one unfortunate experience.” Perhaps Edward isn’t
as inexperienced as was implied before, and thus the reliability of our introductory narrator is
thrown into question. If Edward is likely not actually a virgin, or at least not as inexperienced as
was implied, then what of Florence?
Florence’s worries on consummation are much vaguer than those of Edward, and also
much direr and more sinister. We learn, “Florence’s anxieties were more serious, and there were
moments during the journey from Oxford when she thought she was about to draw on all her
courage to speak her mind. But what troubled her was unutterable, and she could barely frame it
for herself” (McEwan 8). Already, Florence’s situation is tangibly more serious than that of
Edward; Edward, while he cannot bring himself to discuss his problems with Florence,
nevertheless at least possesses words to understand his situation for himself. Florence’s problem,
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however, while also “unutterable” to others, is not even understandable on a personal level; she
can “barely frame it for herself,” and indeed fails to do so throughout the book. She lacks any
language whatsoever for understanding or expressing, to herself or to others, her innermost
difficulty, whatever it may be. Just as we must understand the essence of pornography before we
can appropriately respond to it, she has no understanding of the essence of her problem, and so
cannot respond appropriately, or even at all. And what is her problem? We read,
Where he merely suffered conventional first-night nerves, she experienced a visceral
dread, a helpless disgust as palpable as seasickness… Certainly, the thought of Edward’s
testicles, pendulous below his engorged penis – another horrifying term – had the
potency to make her upper lip curl, and the idea of herself being touched “down there” by
someone else, even someone she loved, was as repulsive as, say, a surgical procedure on
her eye. (McEwan 8-10)
Clearly, the term “misgiving” when applied to Florence’s perspective is grossly inadequate. She
“dreads” sexual encounters, even with Edward, her new husband; she is filled with “disgust,”
“horror,” and even “helplessness.” Most interestingly for the present analysis, Florence finds
sexual encounters “repulsive,” just as I found the equation of art and pornography to be
repulsive. McEwan has given us the opportunity to understand better our own experience
through Florence’s experience – what is the character of Florence’s repulsion, and where does it
come from?
Interestingly, it is not simply the idea of “being touched ‘down there’” by Edward which
so violently disturbs and repulses her in the passage above. Rather, she can’t bear the thought of
being touched “by someone else, even someone she loved” (emphasis mine). Why does she
regress into such a general “someone” here, when Edward was the only person likely to be
49

“touching her down there?” And why should McEwan use the passive voice when relating this
information, and not the active voice? The answer to these questions, I argue, is that Florence’s
fear, rather her deep personal rejection, of sex stems not from her sexual inexperience as implied
by the word “virgin” applied to her in the opening. Rather, her repulsion comes from a disturbing
abundance of sexual experiences surrounding her mysterious familiarity with “hotel rooms”
during trips with her father as a child, experiences which happened to a passive Florence and
were not initiated by an active Florence.
What is going on with Florence and her father? McEwan never explicitly answers this
question. He does, however, provide adequate evidence to discern the answer for ourselves. For
Florence,
[H]er father aroused in her conflicting emotions. There were times when she found him
physically repellent and she could hardly bear the sight of him… She hated hearing his
enthusiastic reports about the boat, the ridiculously named Sugar Plum, which he kept
down in Poole harbor. It grated on her, his accounts of a new kind of sail, a ship-to-shore
radio, a special yacht varnish. He used to take her out with him, and several times, when
she was twelve and thirteen, they crossed all the way to Carteret, near Cherbourg.
(McEwan 61-62)
Notice how she again is “physically repulsed” by her father, in just the same manner that the
prospect of sex with Edward seems to physically repulse her. This repulsion is “aroused” in her,
no less, a word with obvious sexual connotations. What, then, happened on all those yacht trips?
Again, McEwan doesn’t reveal his secrets: “They never talked about those trips. He had never
asked her again, and she was glad” (McEwan 62). While a father taking yacht trips with his
daughter in itself is innocent enough, sinister details begin to add up which are impossible to
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ignore. While they would go out on the boat throughout her childhood, they only took the
particularly long trip “to Carteret” when she was a pubescent “twelve and thirteen” year old girl.
And clearly the trips were a bad experience for her: if she had enjoyed them, she would be glad
to hear of her father’s boat and his new sails and varnish, as these would stir up many happy
memories for her. If she had simply found them boring or tiresome, then at worst her father’s
varnish reports would be a minor annoyance. But such reports actually “grate” on her, and she
hates hearing about the boat. Clearly, the trips were neither enjoyable nor even neutrally boring,
but were in fact traumatic events for her, so much so that she has apparently blocked the
memories of those trips, hiding it by not giving it language for expression. After all, “Such a
language had yet to be invented” (McEwan 171). This same language gap that prevents Florence
from expressing her sexual difficulties to either Edward or to herself is also preventing her from
acknowledging the source of her sexual difficulties: her father had molested her as a child.
Remembering the evidence hinting at this earlier – Florence’s experience with hotels – we learn
later that her father had taken her for “special treats, the one-night business trips to European
cities where she and [her father] always stayed in the grandest hotels” (McEwan 67, emphasis
mine). The conclusion is unavoidable at this point.
Clearly, neither Florence nor Edward were truly “virgins” on their wedding night, then,
or at least both were more experienced than such an appellation led the reader to believe. Do we
thus claim that McEwan’s book fails to give an accurate representation of reality? On the
contrary, consider again the opening lines in which Florence and Edward are called “virgins”:
“They were young, educated, and both virgins on this, their wedding night, and they lived in a
time when a conversation about sexual difficulties was plainly impossible. But it is never easy”
(McEwan 3). I want to argue that this passage is highly complex in its use of point of view,
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moving subtly between two important and vastly different perspectives. The passage begins in
the perspective of both Edward and Florence who, despite their past experiences, believe
themselves to be virgins. While the third-person pronoun obscures this interpretation on a first
reading, the presence of the deictic “this” actually necessitates this interpretation. The statement
could only be uttered, or thought, or believed within the context of the wedding night, even if the
narrator represents the belief verbally to the reader (thus accounting for the third-person
pronoun). Therefore, the belief must belong to Edward or Florence (or rather both), the only two
present on that wedding night, and thus the only two who could possibly see it as “this” their
wedding night. It is not the narrator who is unreliable, per se, but rather Edward and Florence are
themselves complex characters who don’t really understand their own situations. We are thus
invited as readers to try and understand their stories as we read, understanding ourselves better in
the process. McEwan’s own narratorial voice doesn’t appear until the next sentence: “But it is
never easy.” Here we are suddenly and dexterously brought out of the context of the wedding
night, and a general statement about humanity regardless of temporal context is made with the
absolute “never.” Sexual difficulties such as those presented in the book are the same difficulties
which each person must confront in their own implicitly sexual humanity, and thus this book
serves as a way to help dismantle the perpetual difficulty of talking about sexual matters, of
making ourselves so raw and vulnerable in love. The novel doesn’t overly emphasize sexuality
and sex, but rather situates sexuality within a representation of a broader, more holistic, and more
realistic human nature, exploring and emphasizing the complexities of experience rather than
attempting to ignore or simplify reality.
In addition, the novel provides its readers with the “language” which Edward and
Florence so tragically lacked, giving us the opportunity to critically and explicitly deal with our
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own sexual and emotional problems, hopefully helping us to avoid their tragic end of separation
and lost love. Moreover, this novel provides us with unique resources to investigate the physical,
affective, repulsion we originally felt in equating art and pornography. We can’t simply dismiss
Florence’s repulsion because it originated in sexual abuse, and neither can we dismiss our
repulsion as merely the product of social programming. Both deserve deeper investigation and
analysis, as I hope I have shown by the foregoing analysis.
Ian McEwan’s On Chesil Beach is clearly art, probing the depths of human nature and
experience. Given the intricate, implicit beauty which the preceding analysis should have made
manifest, classifying On Chesil Beach as pornography is disquieting at best, and downright
unacceptable at worst. This is despite its sexually explicit, and perhaps even “pornographic,”
passages and descriptions. Its subject matter necessitates such language and work, and McEwan
navigates his topic with beauty and admirable elegance.

Can Porn Be Art?
It should by now be easy to see the difficulties presented when attempting to distinguish
art and pornography. While Rea maintains a distinction between them, he does not allow them to
be mutually-exclusive categories, and in fact seems to think that some examples of pornography
are actually examples of good art as well. Some think that the work of Finley and Sprinkle must
surely be examples of “modern art” and “performance art documentation,” and others think that
the work of Joyce and McEwan must surely be examples of pornography akin to the modern
phenomenon Fifty Shades of Grey.
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It appears we are at an impasse, at which pornographic art and artistic pornography have
met and cannot cross. How are we to resolve this issue? In the next chapter, I will take up the
task of differentiating between pornography and art. Beginning with an examination of the terms
“pornographic” and “artistic” (as opposed to “pornography” and “art”), I will show how it is
possible to have “pornographic art” and “artistic pornography” while nonetheless maintaining
that “pornography” and “art” cannot be applied to the one object (or one token of an object) in a
single context.
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Chapter V
The Aesthetic Perspective Continued:
The Fundamental Differences Between Art and Pornography

In the last chapter, I introduced the common arguments which attempt to link
pornography and art, and proceeded to explore several examples which professedly blur the lines
between pornography and art. It should now be easy to understand how and why some might
argue for such a link. After all, both art and pornography seem to tend toward similar effects,
namely the subversion of cultural norms and the exploration of human traits. And if pornography
really is (or can be) associated with art, any arguments against pornography will become moot.
Establishing a link between pornography and art is the perfect tactic for porn proponents, for if
porn is art, then porn cannot rightly be contained, censored, or fought. Pornography production
and consumption would become rights as fundamental to the human person as the creation and
contemplation of works of art, and the place of pornography in society would become solidified
and fortified beyond reproach.
It is not my belief, however, that such a link between porn and art exists; in fact, such a
correlation would represent a grievous assault on the integrity of art. I will end my thesis now
with an attempt to demonstrate the ways in which pornography and art are actually antithetical to
one another as mutually exclusive categories of classification. First, I will investigate and clarify
the terms “pornographic” and “artistic” in relation to their noun counterparts “pornography” and
“art”; this will reveal how “pornographic art” and “artistic pornography” can exist while “artporn” must remain an impossible oxymoron. I will continue with an investigation into the
differences in the cognitive reception of pornography and art in the human brain. I will
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ultimately conclude this aesthetic investigation (and this thesis) by reviewing Rea’s definition
one last time in order to best understand the fundamental differences between art and porn.

Adjectives vs. Nouns
Where contradiction feels immanent in crossing the terms “art” and “pornography,” I feel
no such contradiction in crossing the terms “artistic” and “pornographic.” Of particular interest,
then, is the relationship between the nouns “pornography” and “art,” and the adjectives
“pornographic” and “artistic.” How could it be that we can correctly describe a certain work as
“pornographic,” while incorrectly classify it as “pornography?” Similarly, how can we truly call
a work “artistic,” while nonetheless falsely classify it as “art?” The answer comes from
understanding the difference between these adjectives and nouns. Stephanie Patridge describes
this distinction well:
[W]e use the adjectival forms of terms for purposes other than indicating what
something’s ontological category is… we might legitimately say of a painting that it is
photographic while consistently denying that it is photography… This leaves open the
possibility that we might rightly call an image pornographic without thereby committing
ourselves to the claim that it is thereby pornography. (Patridge 26)
Given this distinction, we have the freedom to label some pornography as artistic, as it seems
necessary to do, without thereby necessitating the position that the work is art, which seems
incorrect. Recall Rea’s opinions on the artistry of some more prevalent pornography, such as that
produced by Playboy or Penthouse (Rea 125), discussed in the previous chapter. Likewise, we
have the freedom to label some art as pornographic as it seems right to do, without thereby
56

necessitating that it be pornography, which seems incorrect. Ian McEwan’s On Chesil Beach
certainly must not be pornography, though some of the more graphic depictions of sex might be
“pornographic” for some. In more general terms, adjectives do not necessarily equal or imply
their noun-counterparts.
To better understand this crucial distinction, let us ask the following: what might these
adjectives entail when used correctly? Let us begin with “artistic.” First, artistic material is
detailed, with higher degrees of intricacy of detail entailing higher degrees of artistry. This might
also imply a temporal commitment to achieve such detail, but may not be necessary. Second,
technical skill seems a part of “artistic” as well; not just anyone can create something artistic, but
such work rather requires either talent or training to achieve. Third, a major factor of artistic
material is teleological design for some end or purpose; a work possesses higher or lesser
degrees of artistry to the extent that it more or less successfully achieves its purpose.
It should be clear, upon consideration, that pornography can fulfill each of these qualities;
the previous chapter provides many examples. Pornography may be detailed, as indeed some
pornography must be: the slightest defect or imperfection in the bodies represented could
possibly ruin their affect. Time commitment may also come into play here, as some pornographic
photo shoots require hours of make-up preparation, and subsequent hours of photography
sessions while driving after the perfect shot. Pornography may require great skill: on the part of
pornography models, skill is manifest in terms of talent or natural endowment, and also in terms
of long hours of training, preparation, and practice; on the part of pornography producers,
editors, directors, etc., skill is manifest in terms of technical ability as well as training and
practice to learn how to make the most effective pornography. Pornography also is clearly
teleologically designed towards an end, viz., sexual stimulation; as Rounthwaite acknowledges,
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“Porn needs a certain kind of affect: without the ability to generate erotic pleasure, it is
fundamentally unsuccessful” (Rounthwaite 64). This is precisely what Rea drives at in his
definition when he recognizes that sexual stimulation must be the main reason for consuming
pornography, in the fourth qualification of part one of his definition. Thus, we can clearly label
some pornography (though undoubtedly not all pornography) as “artistic.”
What of the term “pornographic?” First, we might suggest that pornographic material is
sexually arousing, or at least is construed as such by the individual consuming the material.
Second, Pornographic material could be subversive, functioning to challenge norms in society,
especially norms surrounding sexuality and sex. On a related note, pornographic material can be
considered offensive or obscene, sometimes because of its subversive nature. Most importantly,
pornographic material is usually, if not always, sexually explicit. Indeed, it is this sexual
explicitness which often gives rise to the previous qualities.
Again, in every case, it is easy to see how art can possibly fit these descriptions, and the
previous chapter again supplies many examples. It could be argued that art is not properly
sexually arousing. Cynthia Freeland develops Kantian aesthetic theory as claiming “our response
has to be disinterested… If a viewer responds to Botticelli’s Venus with an erotic desire, as if she
is a pinup, he is actually not appreciating her for her beauty” (Freeland 14). While this may be
true, it does not erase the possibility that some viewers can (and likely do) respond to Botticelli’s
Venus and other “pornographic art” with sexual arousal, and that by so doing they in no way
impede the work’s classification essentially as “art.” Art also can be subversive, and indeed it
often is. Similarly, art can and often does offend – just think of the perspectives against James
Joyce’s Ulysses which Robert Boyle presented in the previous chapter. Finally, and most
obviously, art can indeed be sexually explicit, as a review of my analysis of On Chesil Beach
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will quickly reveal. Thus, it is clear that art can earn the appellation “pornographic,” importantly
without jeopardizing its essence as “art.”
Given that pornography can be artistic, and art can be pornographic, is it then possible to
say that porn can be art, or that art can be porn? As mentioned earlier, the two intuitively seem to
relate to one another such that one is the contradiction of the other: art cannot at the same time be
porn, nor can porn at the same time be art. Rather, any given work (or any token of any given
work, referring again back to Rea) must necessarily be limited to one or the other category.2 Why
is this so? Let us consider our intuitions of art and those of pornography in juxtaposition with
one another. In this consideration, a few striking distinctions crystalize, revealing just how
opposed porn and art really are: porn is explicit where art is implicit; porn emphasizes the body
where art emphasizes holistic humanity (body and spirit); porn emphasizes fantasy where art
(including fantasy art) always describes some reality of the human condition; porn is full of lies
concerning human sexuality and human nature where art conveys deep truth by confronting the
full complexity of human sexuality, human nature, and human experience. These distinctions
obviously require more discussion, which follows.

Implicit vs. Explicit
One hallmark of great art is its ability to control many aspects of the work, manipulating
form and detail in order to direct a certain interpretation. The more such aspects the artist

2

Since I have spent so much time refining the definition of pornography, a process which has been recognizably
difficult, one might then think that a definition of art would constitute the next step. However, art theory is likewise
a hotly debated topic as critics and philosophers attempt to describe in concrete terms what it means to be art;
Cynthia Freeland notes the “difficulty of coming up with suitable theories” (Freeland xvii) to explain the
phenomenon of art. As such, attempting to craft a better and more refined definition of art seems too far out of my
reach at the present time; I would suggest that this is yet another area which requires further research.
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controls and manipulates, the better art s/he achieves. This means that art is often subtle,
conveying its message implicitly via the network of interconnecting aspects and details
controlled to create its point. Pornography, however, is explicit and superficial. In pornography,
analysis of implicit details is discouraged, due simply to Rounthwaite’s observation that “Porn
needs a certain kind of affect: without the ability to generate erotic pleasure, it is fundamentally
unsuccessful” (Rounthwaite 64). Insofar as this affect must be visceral, physical, and instinctual
(there is no pornography, so far as I am aware, which derives its sexual stimulation via
intellectual analysis of its component parts), then pornography is necessarily limited to
superficial details and cannot manipulate any deeper constructs. Nadine Strossen argues,
“[W]hen we look at sexually explicit depictions… diverse interpretations are possible; no sexual
imagery can be given one universal meaning” (Strossen 155). She argues that pornography
exemplifies the “postructuralist” and “deconstructionist” literary/artistic movements of
modernity insofar as no porn “has any objective, fixed meaning, but rather has a different
meaning for each member of its audience” (Strossen 145). While diverse interpretations may be
possible, my point is that pornographers encourage no interpretation save that of sexual
stimulation, and this is a fundamental departure from works of art. The very fact that multiple
interpretations are possible is in fact argument against labeling pornography as art; while we can
play linguistic semantic games with words and claim that all works of art or literature have
diverse “possible” interpretations, such a claim is meaningless in terms of true artwork. No true
artist is so sloppy as to leave their work open to any interpretation. In other words, it is clear that
art indeed intends few interpretations, and interpretations must always be based on the evidence
which the artist supplies through the work, evidence consciously constructed for the purposes of
guiding that interpretation.
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Besides all of this, if pornography attempted to employ the level of artistry exhibited in
Botticelli’s Venus or McEwan’s On Chesil Beach, such intricacy of detail would necessarily be
lost on its intended audience, which does not consume pornography with the expectation that
such analysis will be used. Pornography is built on instant, physical gratification.3 This means
that time-consuming intellectual pursuits like analysis are necessarily anti-pornographic. Porn is
meant to be consumed few times (perhaps only once), only as long as sexual stimulation is
achieved. Once that stimulation is lost, that specific instance of porn is discarded in search of
other more radical pornography as necessary; note that this is one implication of Rea’s fourth
qualification, i.e., that porn must be sexually stimulating (Rea 120). Art, on the contrary, is
meant to be consumed multiple times, over and over again over a lifetime; the reason for this is
to allow the consumer to slowly, gradually, and intellectually discern all of the artist’s work,
continually uncovering meaning and refining interpretation.
Allow me to emphasize: this does not mean that pornography cannot utilize implication
in its construction. This does mean, rather, that such artistic implication will necessarily be minor
(juvenile, in a sense), or at least lost on the consumers of pornography, who are not interested in
such intellectual and analytical work. Thus, pornography emphasizes the physical, instinctual,
animal, visceral, explicit, and superficial, while art emphasizes the intellectual, rational, implicit,
deep, human, and analytical.

3

The cognitive explanation for this is that pornography creates the same addictive neuro-chemical pathways in the
brain as drugs like crack cocaine (Haney 49; Reed 249; Roller 53, 55). The phenomenon of “escalation” (Reed 251)
is likewise well-documented, as Cyndi Roller in her essay “Sex Addiction and Women: A Nursing Issue” explains:
“Just as the cocaine addict needs more drug to achieve the same high, the sex addict needs more sex to achieve the
same sexual high” (Roller 56). Escalation is extremely important for understanding pornography, in part because it
is essentially a neurobiological explanation of the cultural phenomenon I discussed in the chapter on the origins of
porn, namely that of pushing cultural boundaries as pornography continually grows more and more extreme. On an
individual level, the brain needs more and more extreme pornography over time to achieve the same level of sexual
stimulation.
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Form vs. Content
As suggested from my analysis of On Chesil Beach, art reveals some deep truth about
reality and our human condition, such that pornography reveals no such truth. As. Boyle argues,
“Literature, as I take it, proceeds from skilled writers who have seen [a vision]… A vision,
unlike a calculated manipulation of details, will see evil as it is” (Boyle). We might easily insert
the word “art” where Boyle uses the word “literature” in order to better fit our more general
discussion, since literature is in fact a subset of art. Likewise, we could easily describe
pornography as “a calculated manipulation of details.” In other words, art sees reality, in all its
details (including the sexual, bodily details), but does not pruriently emphasize the pleasure and
attractiveness of sin in the way that pornography does.
Now, it might be argued that, where Boyle here attributes manipulation of details to
pornography, I above attributed manipulation of details to art. Does not art manipulate details in
order to drive the artist’s intended interpretation? Allow me to clarify – when I speak of the
artistic manipulation of details, I mean the manipulation of those details relating most to form. In
other words, art transcends mere content and is concerned with its form, the manner in which its
content is displayed. As Boyle notes, “art sees reality, in all its details”; art conveys truth in its
content, and reinforces that truthful content in its attention to form and representation.
Pornographic manipulation of details, however, has to do with the manipulation of details
relating to content. As Ronald Berger, Patricia Searles, and Charles Cottle note in their book
Feminism and Pornography, pornography offers a “fantasy world,” a “‘utopian kingdom’ of
ever-ready women and ever-hard men” (Berger, Searles, and Cottle 76). These qualities of the
men and women in pornography, as my readers will no doubt (hopefully) concede, are not at all
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existent in the real world; the people of pornography have little in common with real people in
these ways.
While I may not have yet convinced my readers that the fantasy of art and the fantasy of
pornography are fundamentally different, consider more examples of pornography’s claimed
“utopianism.” Pornography proponent Ann Snitow claimed that the “fantasy” of pornography
“can… be wishful, eager, and utopian,” offering “a private path to arousal” (Snitow as quoted in
Strossen 175). While some might argue that fantasy is also an artistic genre, nonetheless the
fantasy purported by pornography is crucially different to artistic fantasy in two major ways: in
kind, and in cognitive reception.
Pornographic fantasy is different in kind than artistic fantasy; consider first artistic
fantasy. Artistic fantasy establishes a mystical, unrealistic context or setting in which characters
nonetheless still participate in our shared human nature; should the characters depart from
human nature, this is usually done in order to investigate the dystopic effects incumbent upon
such a distortion of human nature, as is seen in stories similar to Ursula Le Guin’s The Ones Who
Walk Away From Omelas (this story deletes the reality of suffering as part of the human
condition in the town of Omelas, with the consequence that all the town’s suffering is laid on one
innocent, tortured child; many cannot accept this state of affairs, and so “walk away from
Omelas”). Yet the fantasy established in pornography, while it may be in the contextual setting
as well, actually focuses on distorting human nature as such, in an attempt to create a “‘utopian
kingdom’ of ever-ready women and ever-hard men” (Berger et al. 76), as discussed earlier. Thus,
pornography fails to convey any true vision concerning what it means to be human or how we
ought to live, and in fact works to distort pre-existing true visions.
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Art vs. Porn – Cognitive Reception
Pornographic fantasy also differs from artistic fantasy more importantly in its cognitive
reception in the mind of the consumer. The Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge described
our cognitive interaction with art to be a “willing suspension of disbelief” which “constitutes
poetic faith” (Coleridge 314). This suspension of disbelief allows us to enter into the world of the
works we read, no matter how fanciful or imaginative, and accept their unrealism. Consider our
ability to accept Ian McEwan’s On Chesil Beach to such an extent that we respond emotionally
to Florence and Edward’s break-up. We emotionally invest ourselves deeply in the narrative,
despite McEwan’s disclaimer, “The characters in this novel are inventions and bear no
resemblance to people living or dead. Edward and Florence’s hotel – just over a mile south of
Abbotsbury, Dorset, occupying an elevated position in a field behind the beach parking lot –
does not exist” (McEwan). Yet it is important to understand that, for art, the willing suspension
of disbelief implies a re-assertion of disbelief and distance which allows for the analytical
process to take place.
There are numerous modern-day cognitive theories which attempt to clarify and describe
the same phenomenon. David Duff described this phenomenon as “a double shift of attention”
(Duff 30) in his essay “Melodies of Mind: Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures.” This double
shift involves moving the reader on both an emotional/affective level and a rational/analytic
level. The reader’s attention is “shifted” both
“from everyday thinking and feeling to the intensified emotional and ideational state
produced by poetry, and from an ordinary perception of language… to an artistic
perception of language, which involves conscious apprehension of its sounds and
structures, including the formal architecture of verse. (Duff 30)
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In other words, poetry recognizes the affective and emotional quality of human thought and
feeling, and will speak directly to those affections, bringing the reader into a personal experience
of the feeling and atmosphere which the poem describes. Emphasizing that poetic language is
simply a conscious or intentional use of conventional, everyday language (Duff 30), Duff points
out that poetry simultaneously speaks to rationality in human nature, as we are forced to notice
and analyze the formal details which the poet has manipulated in his/her work. To put this theory
into Coleridge’s terminology, poetry directs us not only to suspend our disbelief that we might
have an affective poetic experience of the work, but it also demands that we retain our rational
wits, or maintain our disbelief, in order to take note of and analyze the formal linguistic devices
and techniques utilized (Duff would likely approve of such a connection with Coleridge, whom
Duff cites extensively in his essay). The main difference between Duff’s position and
Coleridge’s is that Duff emphasizes the contemporaneous, and therefore paradoxically
“impossible” (Duff 31), nature of this experience, as both suspending and asserting disbelief at
the same time; Duff observes, “that impossible double attention is precisely what lyric poetry
seeks” (Duff 31). On the other hand, Coleridge allows a more linear, temporal experience, as the
reader first suspends disbelief in order to consume the art, and then subsequently reasserts
disbelief in order to analyze the art. While Duff emphasizes the unique power of lyric poetry,
especially the ode, in accomplishing this type of cognitive processing, I would argue that the
concept can be more than appropriately applied to literature as a whole.4

Interestingly, Duff mentions the theory of “transportation” in understanding the cognitive reception not only of
literature, but of other forms of media as well, including advertising (Duff 26). Though he claims the theory is “too
crude” to understand the cognition of lyric poetry (and thus he supplies his theory of double attention as discussed in
the main body of my text above), transportation theory itself might be useful as another way of understanding the
cognition of pornography. Duff explains the phenomenon of transportation as that “whereby an individual transfers
attention from his or her world to the simulated world of the story, an experience that alters their perceptions and can
lead to a permanent change in their beliefs and attitudes” (Duff 26). Obviously, the implications of this theory as
applied to pornography consumption gives great credence to the common argument of pornography critics that the
4
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Theodore Bach gives us yet another way to describe this cognitive process in his essay
“Pornography as Simulation.” According to Bach, we use “simulation” in our everyday lives as a
way to “mind read”; we simulate another’s experiences in our own minds in order to discern how
we might act or feel in that situation, and then ascribe the results of that simulation to the other as
a way to better understand them (Bach 54). Essentially, this process is equal to mentally
“walking a mile in another’s shoes.” While Bach argues that this simulation process is used when
consuming pornography, I would argue it is also used in consuming art. When used in the
consumption of art, the process of simulation allows the user to have a more compassionate and
open mind, as they learn to view the world from multiple perspectives and understand multiple
experiences. However, it is important to recognize that, just as the “willing suspension of
disbelief” implies a re-assumption of that belief, so too does the simulation process imply exiting
that process in order to ascribe the results to the other. “One clear difference between the uses of
simulation during mind reading versus porn watching,” Bach stresses, “is that only the former
employs the final projective step” (Bach 59). In other words, when consuming pornography, the
user simulates in his/her own mind the experience of the porn actor/actress on screen in order to
feel sexually stimulated; Bach predicts, “Quite plausibly, watching pornography produces
activation patterns in [the] somatosensory cortex that are similar to patterns produced during
actual sexual activity” (Bach 59). However, the user does not afterwards exit the simulation
process in order to ascribe the results to the actor/actress. The simulation remains inside the user
at all times; no expansion of worldview or compassion takes place.

consumption of pornography causes a subsequent change in men’s perception of women, creating a subconscious
social structure which is inherently discriminatory against women.
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Thus, the problem with classifying pornography as a type of art is that it actively works
against the re-assumption of disbelief or ascription of the results of simulation, thus allowing the
fantasy world it depicts (along with the degrading narrative it tells of women, viz., that it is
acceptable to objectify women sexually and view them more generally as objects to sexual
stimulation and arousal) to become the accepted worldview of its consumers over time. Whether
understood as a suspension of disbelief, a double shift of attention, or a mental simulation of
another’s experience, pornography never exits the process to come back to (or remain in) reality.

The Individual and Social Effects of Porn
The lies told in pornography are taken up in the consumer’s mind to become a part of
their cognitive reality, powerfully reinforced by the newly created addictive neurochemical
pathways (see footnote on page 54). Berger et al. cite radical feminist Kathleen Berry, who:
develops a radical feminist ontology of pornography and its relationship to sexual
fantasy, arguing that pornography is intended for its effect – that is, to elicit sexual
response in viewers… Although consumers of pornography have some choice over what
to interpret as reality, what to attribute to fantasy or distortion, and what to act out, their
choices are based on those experiences that have produced the greatest sexual stimulation
and that therefore have received the most reinforcement… Consequently, personal
fantasy, highly susceptible to pornography, may enter into sexual interaction with
others… Furthermore, when pornographic fantasies are violent, sexual arousal becomes
conditioned to violence and internal prohibitions against acting out such fantasies are
reduced. (Berger et al. 38)
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Berry here recognizes again the conceded possibility of multiple and diverse interpretations of
pornography, but note that the reasonable or expected interpretations of pornography are in fact
limited to those which receive the most cognitive reward via sexual stimulation and pleasure, and
this effect is increased as pornography grows more extreme and violent. Notice also Berger et
al.’s claim (qua Berry) that “sexual arousal becomes conditioned to violence” (Berger et al. 38,
emphasis mine). As the user consumes more pornography, requiring more extreme forms to
achieve the same sexual “high,” the user will become “conditioned” or addicted to these more
extreme forms, finding them acceptable and stimulating where s/he might not have before.5 As
Bach suggests, “I do not believe that the growing population of porn categories exists in response
to people’s antecedent desires. Rather, these categories create desires, and these new desires may
conflict with the standards of wellbeing and moral behavior” (Bach 62). As society consumes
more pornography, socio-cultural standards of acceptability surrounding sexual behavior are
pushed against and stretched, allowing more extreme pornography to exist, which in turn pushes
even more against those boundaries and standards. This is precisely the argument discovered in
the historical perspective;6 notice that another direct implication of this is that pornography is not
“normal,” “natural,” or “expressive of our deepest humanity,” but is in fact manufactured,
unnatural, and a perversion of our humanity.
With this in mind, the increasingly pervasive and extreme genre of violent pornography
should come as no surprise, and should be exceedingly disturbing. Recall Susan Hawthorne’s
words, from my chapter on the historical perspective, on the “de-moralizing effect” of
pornography on the culture (Hawthorne 44). Hawthorne’s warning could be understood as the

5
6

This is simply another way of understanding the phenomenon of escalation; see note 3 above (page 54).
Recall this argument was reinforced on an individual, neurochemical level in note 3 as well.
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fact that the consumers of violent pornography will inevitably fail to re-assume their disbelief,
and thus the entire social atmosphere will become gradually and increasingly more hostile and
objectifying towards women in general.
Michael Rea also contributes arguments in favor of pornography’s fantasy; he does this
when he argues against definitions of pornography as “a form of (or contributor to) oppression”
(Rea 123) (the fifth of the six preexisting definitions he argues against). He claims:
[T]he producers of Penthouse might well argue that their pictures do not say anything
about women generally. At most they say of particular women that they are mere objects.
But even this is a stretch; for the photos in pornographic magazines are often
accompanied by biographical information about the women depicted, thus
communicating that they are more than mere sex objects. (Rea 131)
Rea is here arguing against the claim that all pornography is oppressive towards women in its
objectification of women. He proposes that the presence of biographical information nullifies the
possibility that the women depicted could be viewed as mere sex objects, and that there is thus
really no reason to consider pornography to be oppressive either to the women depicted or to
women in general. Yet I reply that pornography is in its nature very general, and this
generalizability helps to establish as its referent the entire class of women rather than merely
particular women. This is, granted, most especially true in the instance of pornography which
does not include any such biographical information of the women depicted. However, I would
ask to what extent such biographical information, when it is indeed present, is in fact a part of the
experience of pornography – is such biographical information really relevant or important to the
pornography produced? In reality, the same affect could be achieved in the absence of such
specific information, as in fact it most often is.
69

I must again emphasize at this point that that sexual explicitness by itself, even such that
is violent, is not at all times and contexts pornography (though it likely is always pornographic),
but can in fact be art in the right context. Sexually explicit descriptions as found in On Chesil
Beach are of a fundamentally different kind than those found in Fifty Shades of Grey, for
example. Clare McGlynn and Ian Ward argue just this kind of contextual complexity in their
joint essay “Pornography, Pragmatism, and Proscription.” Calling upon the thought of Martha
Nussbaum and Richard Rorty, they note:
Objectification of the female body may well harm in certain contexts; in others it may
not. In some instances it may need to be proscribed: most obviously in the case of child
abuse images, or in principle at least, extreme violence. In others it may not. It is for this
reason that we can accept depictions of female sexuality in texts such as Lawrence’s Lady
Chatterly’s Lover or Henry James’s The Golden Bowl, whilst expressing rather greater
doubt as we turn the pages of Playboy or peruse rapedbitch.com. While the former, as
Nussbaum argues, can be defended in terms of a capacity to liberate an erotic female
experience, to promote emotional growth perhaps, the latter, which seeks merely to
degrade and to silence, cannot. (McGlynn and Ward 341).
Where true art and literature have the ability to depict sexuality in such a way as to honestly
wrestle with the deepest complexities of humanity and describe the truth of human nature,
pornography can never do so. Ian McEwan uses sexually explicit language and descriptions as a
way of exploring the complex characters of Florence and Edward – Edward, who is full of lust
but lacking in love, and Florence who is full of love, but deeply damaged by her father and
unable to connect on a carnal level. Pornography, however, suggests that women are “everready” and men “ever-hard.” Ian McEwan’s work, if read with maturity, will most certainly
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foster emotional growth as we learn to take risks and embrace the vulnerability of our humanity
for the sake of love; pornography is simply incapable of such profound and holistic insight. Art
fantasy and porn fantasy are clearly different from one another.
While there may exist artistic porn, and pornographic art, the impossibility of the
existence of “art-porn” or “porn-art” ought now to be clear. Pornography is false, fanciful,
physical, animalistic, instinctual, explicit, superficial, impossible, deceptive, lustful, lazy, selfish,
isolating, unhealthy, etc. Art, on the other hand, is true, real, holistic, human, intellectual,
implicit, deep, possible, authentic, loving, mature, selfless, communicative, healthy, etc. While
the two may perform similar functions at times, such as subverting cultural norms, they
nonetheless accomplish this in fundamentally differing ways, ways which will ultimately carry
with them different effects on cognitive-individual and socio-cultural levels. Pornography cannot
be described as “non-artistic” or as “bad art,” but is in fact non-art, or anti-art.

Revisiting Rea and One Last Time
Flowing from this discussion comes the final review of Rea’s definition. First, allow me
to restate Rea’s definition, in its currently modified form (personal additions are underlined,
while personal excisions are struck through):
Part 1: x is used (or treated) as pornography by a person S =DF (i) x is a token of some
sort of communicative material (picture, paragraph, phone call, performance,
etc.), (ii) S desires to be sexually aroused or gratified by the communicative
content of x, (iii) if S believes that the communicative content of x is intended to
foster any intimacy besides sexual or physical intimacy between S and the
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subject(s) of x, that belief is not among S’s reasons for attending
to x’s content, and (iv) if S’s desire to be sexually aroused or gratified by the
communicative content of x were no longer among S’s reasons for attending to
that content, S would have at most a weak desire to attend to x’s content.
Part 2: x is pornography =DF it is reasonable to believe that (i) x will be used
(or treated) as pornography by most of its actual audience for which it was
produced, and (ii) x will be considered obscenely disrespectful towards sexuality
and/or sex by most members of its socio-cultural context. (Rea 120)
I have made three major changes to Rea’s definition, in order to craft the modified version here
presented. Recall that Rea’s original definition 1) prohibited “x” from fostering any form of
intimacy in order to be considered pornography, 2) focused only on the reception of “x” in its
target audience, and 3) did not include any obscenity qualification. In the course of investigating
some of Rea’s hypothetical thought experiments, I found that pornography could remain
pornography even if it attempted to create, foster, or maintain an intimate relationship which was
purely physical or sexual; anything which conveyed love or some meaning beyond mere sexual
stimulation could by so doing avoid qualifying as pornography. With reference to the
pornography’s reception, I found that emphasizing the “target” audience ultimately ignored and
so failed to solve the contextual problem, i.e., that the same object can somehow be pornography
in one context and yet not pornography in another. Investigating the historical origins of
pornography, I found that pornography inherently carried with it the consequence of pushing
against social boundaries, disrespecting societal norms and understandings of sex and sexuality,
and was thus necessarily obscene on a sexual level. While Rea did explicitly argue against
obscenity definitions for pornography, I hope the cognitive arguments I’ve presented in this
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chapter have further justified my decision to amend his definition to include the obscenity
qualification.
Given these changes, does this new definition account for the true difference between art
and pornography? After all, if sexual stimulation is the chief reason to consume pornography,
such that a lack of sexual stimulation would result in no longer consuming pornography, we
might think that art is that which is consumed for other reasons beyond sexual stimulation and so
would still be consumed if that stimulation were not achieved. But is then Annie Sprinkle’s
“performance art documentation” of masturbation and sex scenes to be considered art,
considering some commentators claim that the scenes hold other messages beyond sexual
stimulation? Given Rea’s definition, I would have to concede that some find in Annie Sprinkle’s
work merit beyond sexual stimulation, and therefore it is not pornography, at least not for those
individuals. While I have not personally viewed Deep Inside and so cannot pronounce a
judgment on the work myself, I must approach the work with some measure of significant doubt
as to its artistic merit. The reason for this is that there is one final, personal qualification which I
would add to Rea’s definition: pornography is not only that which is obscenely disrespectful of
cultural boundaries surrounding sex and sexuality, but is also that which distorts the objective
nature of sex itself. This addition, however, were I to officially add it to Rea’s definition, would
require a deeper investigation into the nature of sex itself, an investigation which I clearly do not
have the space to pursue in these last pages of my thesis. As such, I will leave my reader with
this extra amendment merely as a personal suggestion, and instead simply state that I find it
unlikely that Deep Inside could achieve the level of artistic expression attained in On Chesil
Beach.
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I do not believe any further modification to Rea’s definition is desirable or possible,
given both the foregoing investigation and what little time and space I have remaining for this
thesis. Instead, I believe this definition, coupled with the intensive investigation of porn and art
in this chapter, should provide an adequate foundation for understanding pornography itself. It
should therefore also illustrate how we can distinguish between art and pornography. With these
crucial distinctions made, it is now possible to move on to the next step: constructing an
appropriate response to the problem of porn.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion – The Problem of Porn Solved?
By now I hope I’ve made clear the fact that pornography and art are radically different
from one another. They are different in their content. They are different in their worldview. They
are different in their values. They are different in their cognitive effect and reception. They are
different in their very essence. And so they ought to be different in our responses to them. Art is
an elevated form of human expression, a place where human creativity allows a deep probing
and exploration of human nature and experience, a place where the deepest truths of reality and
humanity can be touched upon. Pornography is on the other hand a very base form of human
expression, distorting and perverting human sexuality, human desires, human perspectives, and
human nature itself. In other words, pornography is a problem, a grave problem that presents
grave dangers to individuals, to societies, and ultimately to the human race as a whole.
With that claim duly noted and argued, I must reiterate the many areas which are in
desperate need of further research and thought in order to fully understand pornography. There is
unarguably a deep and disconcerting relationship between pornography and prostitution; the
etymology of the word “pornography” (from the Greek graphos for “writing” and pornei for
“prostitutes”; pornography thus literally means “the writing or description of prostitution and/or
prostitutes”) is adequate evidence of this, as is the historical origins of the term in Rétif’s treatise
on prostitution Le pornographe. But the full extent and implications of this relationship have yet
to be uncovered. What does it mean, both for our understanding of pornography and our
understanding of prostitution, that these two categories are intimately and inextricably
connected?
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Another area that demands research as touched upon in my thesis is the nature of human
sexuality and sex, and their proper uses and purposes. I believe sex is meant, whether from a
scientific/evolutionary viewpoint or a philosophic/religious viewpoint, to be a means of powerful
physical and emotional bonding between one man and one woman, as well as a means towards
the procreation of new human persons. This belief, at least in the context of contemporary
Western culture, is obviously highly-contested, however, to the great confusion and
consternation of contemporary discussions surrounding sexuality, including the present
discussion on pornography. As such, this represents a major area which necessitates further
research and greater understanding in the future, and I earnestly suggest that this research be
taken up as soon as possible.
One more area of further research which I have emphasized in the previous chapter is the
psychological, cognitive, and neurobiological effects of pornography. While I utilized to some
extent the existing scholarship on pornography from these disciplines in my treatment of the
difference between pornography and art, I must also note that as of today the current studies on
pornography are highly controversial. While psychologists and neuroscientists on a fairly regular
basis discover more and more evidence for the negative psychological effects of pornography
consumption, nevertheless much more research is required in order to help resolve the current
controversy and confusion surrounding many of the results of these studies. Concrete
psychological and neuroscientific studies investigating the long-term effects of pornography on
an individual level, including the phenomenon of escalation, are necessary. So too are studies
into the effects of pornography on entire societies, perhaps from the viewpoint of cognitive
anthropology.
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Until these areas of further research are achieved, however, I do hope my thesis has
contributed to a better understanding of the essence of pornography. By way of constructing an
appropriate response, I would suggest that greater education on sex and sexuality in general, and
on pornography in particular, would be greatly beneficial, and so this thesis represents my own
first step toward that greater education. Education especially designed for the youth is important,
in order to help children develop the tools necessary for analyzing and sorting through the
pornographic media they are inundated with in popular culture. In this way, we can hope to avoid
more and more children innocently falling into pornography addiction. Only once we are armed
with knowledge, a quality which is diametrically opposed to pornography’s emphasis on pure
physicality, can we fully participate in facing and answering the problem of porn.
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Appendix
Dealing with Pornography Addiction, for Yourself or for Loved Ones

So now you’re ready to give up your pornography or sex addiction. Or perhaps you’re not
ready, but you know you want to be free from your physical and emotional pornography chains.
Whether you’ve just gotten hooked on pornography, or your addiction has escalated to sex
affairs and prostitution, there is always hope for recovery. Use this appendix as a place to start, to
get your bearings, and to find the resources and help you need in order to live a free and fulfilling
life without dependence on sex.
As you begin your fight against pornography, it will be helpful for you to consider the
realities of pornography – uncovering the lies told in pornography will help you maintain your
motivation on the road to sobriety. Rory Reid and Dan Gray describe the truths of pornography
concisely in their book Confronting Your Spouse’s Pornography Problem: “Pornography teaches
a fraudulent message about human intimacy. It portrays both men and women as objects with
insatiable sexual appetites or with unrealistic physical capabilities” (Reid and Gray 16). As you
view pornography, your brain releases the pleasure chemical dopamine and creates a neural
pathway called iFosB (delta fos b) which tells your brain to come back to porn as a source of
pleasure (“Porn Addiction Escalates”). Thus, watching pornography literally changes the
physical make-up of your brain as you learn to desire and expect pornographic sex. As your
brain becomes accustomed and addicted to these fraudulent pornographic messages, your sex life
in reality will become less and less fulfilling as it continually fails to live up to the promises of
porn.
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Remember also that pornography purposefully hides the realistic consequences of the
promiscuous activity which it depicts, since such consequences would destroy the “sexy” and
“arousing” affect of pornography. Including such consequences is the mark of art, which sees the
world as it really is. Pornography, for the sake of achieving arousal, ignores realities “such as
sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies” (Reid and Gray 16). Reid and Gray use
the psychological term “attention bias” when discussing this lie in pornography. They observe,
For example, you might perceive the content [of pornography] as exciting or pleasurable
while ignoring the fraudulent messages about human sexuality associated with it. Women
in real life seldom have insatiable sexual appetites and rarely act sexually promiscuous
without drugs, financial compensation, or other problems in living. The behavior depicted
as harmless fun would inevitably result in unwanted pregnancies or sexually transmitted
diseases. Imagine how excited you’d feel sitting in a medical clinic waiting for results
from an HIV test. Clients say it’s hell. These are the realities you ignore whenever you
consume pornography. (Reid and Gray 113)
If you remember these realities, pornography will suddenly seem much less attractive, and it will
be easier to fight your addiction. In this way, a powerful tool for combatting the lies of
pornography addiction is to research and educate yourself on the truth of sexual promiscuity and
the other arousing or exciting aspects of pornography.
One helpful strategy for fighting pornography addiction, then, is finding and maintaining
motivation. Harness this motivation, and try to attach it to a token, a small, physical object which
you can carry around with you to reinvigorate and remind you of your enthusiasm to fight.
Something with some emotional power can work great as a motivational token, such as a picture
of a loved one (significant other, child, parent or grandparent, friend) or a religious token such as
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a rosary, prayer beads, a prayer book, etc. When you feel the addictive temptation to consume
pornography again, recognize this critical moment as a moment of temptation, find your
motivational token and physically hold it in your hands for strength and support. If you are
religious or spiritual, the importance of prayer cannot be overstated, as you draw upon the
strength and power of God when you are feeling weak and powerless. Fasting can be another
great spiritual way to strengthen your resolve in practicing self-denial and discipline. If you are
not religious or spiritual, reciting aloud an affirmation of your resolve to overcome pornography
can be a useful strategy for boosting your motivation and giving you extra strength in moments
of weakness.
Other external safeguards, such as internet filters and internet usage report services, can
be powerful in your fight against pornography addiction. Ask someone else, a loved one or an
accountability partner (see the following paragraph), to set up a filter on your computer, tablet,
smartphone, and/or other internet-capable device(s). Ask them to create and set the password,
and ask them to keep that password secret from you until you have been sober long enough to
fight the temptation on your own. Internet usage report services, such as those provided by
CovenantEyes (covenanteyes.com), can be a powerful motivation booster, and also a useful tool
for parents who want to prevent their children from falling into a pornography problem.
Especially at the beginning of your fight for sobriety, such safeguards as these can be invaluable
aids to your strength and motivation.
In addition to motivation tokens and internet safeguards, an accountability partner is
another invaluable tool for overcoming addiction. External support in the form of support
groups, mentors, or spiritual directors is extremely helpful and important. In situations of
addiction, it can be easy to talk yourself into relapse and giving in to your powerful desires and
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temptations. Externalizing your responsibility to another person makes this sort of self-defeat
much easier to avoid. As Reid and Gray suggest, “Learning to interact with and rely on others is
the antithesis of the isolating and disconnecting influence habitual pornography use can have”
(Reid and Gray 102). Remaining truthful about your pornography problem with others that
support you can help you to overcome the lies, deceit, and isolation which feed and enable your
addiction. There exist numerous pornography support groups, such as Sexaholics Anonymous
(www.sa.org), Sex Addicts Anonymous (www.saa.org), and many more. Whether you find help
in a therapist, a support group, or a spiritual director, community support is invaluable to the
recovery of many pornography addicts.
The situation of loved ones in your addiction recovery process should be slightly
different. Loved ones can be and should be an excellent source of help, support, and strength in
your recovery, and as such they can be an excellent resource for externalizing your responsibility
to help you stay on track. However, they will be less likely to understand fully the nature of your
addiction in the way that a professional or support group would, and so would be less able to
help your specific addiction problems. Also, you must keep in mind that your pornography
addiction affects those around you, most especially your immediate family in your significant
other or children. It is critical that you be honest and open with your family about your problem
in order to overcome the lies which enable a pornography addiction; however, learning of your
addiction can be emotionally traumatic for them as well (when disclosing a pornography
addiction to children, great care should be taken not to tell them too many traumatic and/or
graphic details; respect their innocence and vulnerability, remaining honest with them without
endangering them in their youthful curiosity). Some family members may find the need to enter
into counseling and therapy as well in order to work through their feelings of betrayal. Since they
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will need their strength to work through any emotional repercussions they may experience, they
will likely be less able to give you strength to work through your own repercussions, and thus a
third-party support resource is your best option. I cannot emphasize enough the importance of
honesty and openness with your loved ones, most especially your spouse or significant other,
since deceit and lies to your loved ones are to a large extent what enabled your pornography
problem to evolve into an addiction. But keep in mind that they may need as much support and
emotional recovery as you do.
Above all, it is of paramount importance to keep hope and perseverance in mind always.
According to Dr. G. Alan Marlatt in his research on relapse prevention, “understanding relapse
as part of the process of change” (Reid and Gray 129) is an important skill. The longer you have
built up your pornography and sex addiction, the longer it will take to overcome it. The road will
be long and difficult, but it is not impossible. You may stumble, fall, and relapse into your
addiction, but it is critical that you pick yourself back up and continue on. Pornography addiction
only has power over you when you give up. As long as you have hope, you can and you will
emerge from the struggle victorious.
If you are not personally struggling with pornography, but want to help someone who is,
my best advice to you is to refer him/her to this appendix. Pornography addicts must help
themselves before anyone else can help them. If addicts don’t have an accurate understanding of
the problem and enough personal motivation to fight for themselves, they will not recover. Only
once they have made the decision to change and overcome their addictive lifestyle can you then
provide them necessary support in listening to their struggles and holding them accountable. If
you are religious, spend time in prayer and fasting for them. Try to be understanding and
supportive of their problems and struggles, recognizing that their addiction is a physical problem
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which has developed in the neurochemistry of the brain. At the same time, recognize that they
have the power to overcome this addiction, only they have that power, and you can help by
holding them responsible for their actions. Above all, recognize that their addiction is NOT your
fault. A pornography addiction has nothing to do with you or your inadequacies or imperfections,
but instead has everything to do with the addict’s inability to cope with stress and the challenges
of life in healthy ways (Reid and Gray 136). There is always hope for the pornography addict,
and you can provide invaluable support in that journey, but ultimately the problem belongs to the
addict as does the recovery process, and is not yours to maintain ownership of and/or
responsibility for.
The following is a list of a few websites which will be beneficial in your fight against
pornography and sex addiction. Each website contains their own pages of resources you can
utilize, from support groups to books to more websites to counseling and more. Make use of any
or all of these resources as they fit into your particular situation, and remember that there is
always hope.

www.covenanteyes.com – Internet accountability, tracking, and filtering, along with other
resources
www.k9webprotection.com – A free, alternative web browser with enhanced filtering usable on
any device
www.fightthenewdrug.org – Education, blogs, merchandise, and resources
www.integrityrestored.com – Catholic support, education, and resources for addicts and their
loved ones
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